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Abstract
Recent increase in online privacy concerns prompts the following question: can a recommender
system be accurate if users do not entrust it with their private data? To answer this, we study the
problem of learning item-clusters under local differential privacy, a powerful, formal notion of data
privacy. We develop bounds on the sample-complexity of learning item-clusters from privatized
user inputs. Significantly, our results identify a sample-complexity separation between learning in
an information-rich and an information-scarce regime, thereby highlighting the interaction between
privacy and the amount of information (ratings) available to each user.
In the information-rich regime, where each user rates at least a constant fraction of items, a
spectral clustering approach is shown to achieve a sample-complexity lower bound derived from
a simple information-theoretic argument based on Fano’s inequality. However, the information-
scarce regime, where each user rates only a vanishing fraction of items, is found to require a fun-
damentally different approach both for lower bounds and algorithms. To this end, we develop new
techniques for bounding mutual information under a notion of channel-mismatch, and also propose
a new algorithm, MaxSense, and show that it achieves optimal sample-complexity in this setting.
The techniques we develop for bounding mutual information may be of broader interest. To
illustrate this, we show their applicability to (i) learning based on 1-bit sketches, and (ii) adaptive
learning, where queries can be adapted based on answers to past queries.
Keywords: Differential privacy, recommender systems, lower bounds, partial information
1. Introduction
Recommender systems are fast becoming one of the cornerstones of the Internet; in a world with
ever increasing choices, they are one of the most effective ways of matching users with items. Today,
many websites use some form of such systems. Research in these algorithms received a fillip from
the Netflix prize competition in 2009. Ironically, however, the contest also exposed the Achilles heel
of such systems, when Narayanan and Shmatikov (2006) demonstrated that the Netflix data could
be de-anonymized. Subsequent works (for example, Calandrino et al. (2011)) have reinforced belief
in the frailty of these algorithms in the face of privacy attacks.
To design recommender systems in such scenarios, we first need to define what it means for a
data-release mechanism to be private. The popular perception has coalesced around the notion that
a person can either participate in a recommender system and waive all claims to privacy, or avoid
such systems entirely. The response of the research community to these concerns has been the
development of a third paradigm between complete exposure and complete silence. This approach
has been captured in the formal notion of differential privacy (refer Dwork (2006)); essentially it
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suggests that although perfect privacy is impossible, one can control the leakage of information
by deliberately corrupting sensitive data before release. The original definition in Dwork (2006)
provides a statistical test that must be satisfied by a data-release mechanism to be private. Accepting
this paradigm shifts the focus to designing algorithms that obey this constraint while maximizing
relevant notions of utility. This trade-off between utility and privacy has been explored for several
problems in database management Blum et al. (2005); Dwork (2006); Dwork et al. (2006, 2010a,b)
and learning Blum et al. (2008); Chaudhuri et al. (2011); Gupta et al. (2011); Kasiviswanathan et al.
(2008); McSherry and Mironov (2009); Smith (2011).
In the context of recommender systems, there are two models for ensuring privacy: central-
ized and local. In the centralized model, the recommender system is trusted to collect data from
users; it then responds to queries by publishing results that have been corrupted via some differen-
tially private mechanism. However, users increasingly desire control over their private data, given
their mistrust in centralized databases (which is supported by examples such as the Netflix privacy
breach). In cases where the database cannot be trusted to keep data confidential, users can store
their data locally, and differential privacy is ensured through suitable randomization at the ‘user-
end’ before releasing data to the recommender system. This is precisely the context of the present
paper: the design of differentially private algorithms for untrusted recommender systems.
The latter model is variously known in privacy literature as local differential privacy (see Kasiviswanathan et al.
(2008); we henceforth refer to it as local-DP ), and in statistics as the ‘randomized response tech-
nique’ (see Warner (1965)). However, there are two unique challenges to local-DP posed by recom-
mender systems which have not been satisfactorily dealt with before:
1. The underlying space (here, the set of ratings over all items) has very high dimensionality.
2. The users have limited information: they rate only a (vanishingly small) fraction of items.
In this work we address both these issues. We consider the problem of learning an unknown (low-
dimensional) clustering for a large set of items from privatized user-feedback. Surprisingly, we
demonstrate a sharp change in the sample-complexity of local-DP learning algorithms when shift-
ing from an information-rich to an information-scarce regime – no similar phenomenon is known
for non-private learning. With the aid of new information-theoretic arguments, we provide lower
bounds on the sample-complexity in various regimes. On the other hand, we also develop novel
algorithms, particularly in the information-scarce setting, which match the lower bounds up to loga-
rithmic factors. Thus although we pay a ‘price of privacy’ when ensuring local-DP in untrusted rec-
ommender systems with information-scarcity, we can design optimal algorithms for such regimes.
1.1. Our Results
We focus on learning a generative model for the data, under user-end, or local differential privacy
constraints. Local differential privacy ensures that user data is privatized before being made avail-
able to the recommender system – the aim of the system is thus to learn the model from privatized
responses to (appropriately designed) queries. The metric of interest is the sample-complexity – the
minimum number of users required for efficient learning.
Formally, given a set of items, we want to learn a partition or clustering of the item-set, such
that items within a cluster are statistically similar (in terms of user-ratings). The class of models (or
hypothesis class) we wish to learn is thus the set of mappings from items [N ]1 to clusters [L] (where
typically L << N ). The system can collect information from U users, where each user has rated
1. Throughout the paper, we use [N ] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , N}.
2
PRICE OF PRIVACY
only w out of the N items, and interacts with the system via a mechanism satisfying ǫ-local-DP. To
be deemed successful, we require that an algorithm identify the correct cluster label for all items2.
To put the above model in perspective, consider the problem of movie-recommendation – here
items are movies, and the recommender system wants to learn a clustering of these movies, wherein
two movies in a cluster are ‘similar’. We assume that each user has watched w movies, but is
unwilling to share these ratings with the recommender system without appropriate privatization of
their data. Once the recommender system has learnt a good clustering, it can make this knowledge
public, allowing users to obtain their own recommendations, based on their viewing history. This is
similar in spirit to the ‘You Might Also Like’ feature on IMDB or Amazon.
Our starting point for sample-complexity bounds is the following basic lower bound (c.f. Sec-
tion 2 for details):
Informal Theorem 1 (Theorem 7) For any (finite) hypothesis class H to be ‘successfully’ learned
under ǫ-local-DP, the number of users must satisfy: ULB = Ω
(
log |H|
ǫ
)
.
The above theorem is based on a standard use of Fano’s inequality in statistical learning. Similar
connections between differential privacy and mutual information have been established before (c.f.
Section 1.2) – we include it here as it helps put our main results in perspective.
Returning to the recommender system problem, note that for the problem of learning item-
clusters, log |H| = Θ(N). We next consider an information-rich setting, wherein w = Ω(N), i.e.,
each user knows ratings for a constant fraction of the items. We show the above bound is matched
(up to logarithmic factors) by a local-DP algorithm based on a novel ‘pairwise-preference’ sketch
and spectral clustering techniques:
Informal Theorem 2 (Theorem 8) In the information-rich regime under ǫ-local-DP, clustering via
the Pairwise-Preference Algorithm succeeds if the number of users satisfies: U IRPP = Ω
(
N logN
ǫ
)
.
The above theorems thus provide a complete picture of the information-rich setting. In practical
scenarios, however, w is quite small; for example, in a movie ratings system, users usually have seen
and rated only a vanishing fraction of movies. Our main results in the paper concern non-adaptive,
local-DP learning in the information-scarce regime – wherein w = o(N). Herein, we observe an
interesting phase-change in the sample-complexity of private learning:
Informal Theorem 3 In the information-scarce regime under ǫ-local-DP, the number of users re-
quired for non-adaptive cluster learning must satisfy: U ISLB = Ω
(
N2
w2
)
(Theorem 13).
Furthermore, for small w, in particular, w = o(N 13 ), we have: U ISLB = Ω
(
N2
w
)
(Theorem 14).
To see why this result is surprising, consider the following toy problem: each item i ∈ [N ]
belongs to one of two clusters. Users arrive, sample a single item uniformly at random and learn its
corresponding cluster, answer a query from the recommender system, and leave.
For non-private learning, if there is no constraint on the amount of information exchanged be-
tween the user and the algorithm, then the number of users needed for learning the clusters is
Θ(N logN) (via a simple coupon-collector argument). Note that the amount of data each user
has is Θ(logN) (item index+cluster). Now if we put a constraint that the average amount of in-
formation exchanged between a user and the algorithm is 1 bit, then intuition suggests that the
2. This is for ease of exposition – our results extend to allowing a fraction of item-misclassifications, c.f. Appendix A.
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recommender system now needs O
(
N log2N
)
users. This is achieved by the following simple
strategy: each user reveals her complete information with probability 1logN , else reveals no infor-
mation – clearly the amount of information exchanged per user is 1 bit on average, and a modified
coupon collector argument shows that this scheme requires O(N log2N) users to learn the item
clusters.
However, the situation changes if we impose a condition that the amount of information ex-
changed is exactly 1 bit per user (for example, the algorithm asks a yes/no question to the user);
as a side-product of the techniques we develop for Theorem 14, we show that the number of users
required in this case is O(N2) (c.f. Theorem 10). This fundamental change in sample-complexity
scaling is due to the combination of users having limited information and a ‘per-user information’
constraint (as opposed to the average information constraint). One major takeaway of our work is
that local differential privacy in the information-scarce regime has a similar effect.
Finally for the information-scarce regime, we develop a new algorithm, MaxSense, which (un-
der appropriate separation conditions) matches the above bound up to logarithmic factors:
Informal Theorem 4 (Theorem 15) In the information-scarce regime under ǫ-local-differential-
privacy, for given w = o(N), clustering via the MaxSense Algorithm (Section 5) is successful if the
number of users satisfies: UMS = Ω
(
N2 logN
wǫ
)
.
Techniques: Our main technical contribution lies in the tools we use for the lower bounds in the
information-scarce setting. By viewing the privacy mechanism as a noisy channel with appro-
priate constraints, we are able to use information theoretic methods to obtain bounds on private
learning. Although connections between privacy and mutual information have been considered
before (refer McGregor et al. (2010); Alvim et al. (2011)), existing techniques do not capture the
change in sample-complexity in high-dimensional regimes. We formalize a new notion of ‘chan-
nel mis-alignment’ between the ‘sampling channel’ (the partial ratings known to the users) and the
privatization channel. In Section 4 we provide a structural lemma (Lemma 9) that quantifies this
mismatch under general conditions, and demonstrate its use by obtaining tight lower bounds under
1-bit (non-private) sketches. In Section 4.3 we use it to obtain tight lower bounds under local-DP.
In Section 6 we discuss its application to adaptive local-DP algorithms, establishing a lower bound
of order Ω(N logN) – note that this again is a refinement on the bound in Theorem 7. Though we
focus on the item clustering problem, our lower bounds apply to learning any finite hypothesis class
under privacy constraints.
The information theoretic results also suggest that 1-bit privatized sketches are sufficient for
learning in such scenarios. Based on this intuition, we show how existing spectral-clustering tech-
niques can be extended to private learning in some regimes. More significantly, in the information-
scarce regime, where spectral learning fails, we develop a novel algorithm based on blind probing
of a large set of items. This algorithm, in addition to being private and having optimal sample-
complexity in many regimes, suggests several interesting open questions, which we discuss in Sec-
tion 7.
1.2. Related Work
Privacy preserving recommender systems: The design of recommender systems with differential
privacy was studied by McSherry and Mironov (2009) under the centralized model. Like us, they
separate the recommender system into two components, a learning phase (based on a database
appropriately perturbed to ensure privacy) and a recommendation phase (performed by the users
4
PRICE OF PRIVACY
‘at home’, without interacting with the system). They numerically compare the performance of
the algorithm against non-private algorithms. In contrast, we consider a stronger notion of privacy
(local-DP), and for our generative model, are able to provide tight analytical guarantees and further,
quantify the impact of limited information on privacy.
Private PAC Learning and Query Release: Several works have considered private algorithms
for PAC-learning. Blum et al. (2008); Gupta et al. (2011) consider the private query release prob-
lem (i.e., releasing approximate values for all queries in a given class) in the centralized model.
Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008) show equivalences between: a) centralized private learning and ag-
nostic PAC learning, b) local-DP and the statistical query (SQ) model of learning; this line of work
is further extended by Beimel et al. (2010). Although some of our results (in particular, Theorem
7) are similar in spirit to lower bounds for PAC (see Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008); Beimel et al.
(2010) there are significant differences both in scope and technique. Furthermore:
1. We emphasize the importance of limited information, and characterize its impact on learning
with local-DP. Hitherto unconsidered,information scarcity is prevalent in practical scenarios,
and as our results shows, it has strong implications on learning performance under local-DP.
2. Via lower bounds, we provide a tight characterization of sample-complexity, unlike Kasiviswanathan et al.
(2008); Blum et al. (2008); Gupta et al. (2011), which are concerned with showing polyno-
mial bounds. This is important for high dimensional data.
Privacy in Statistical Learning: A large body of recent work has looked at the impact of differ-
ential privacy on statistical learning techniques. A majority of this work focusses on centralized
differential privacy. For example, Chaudhuri et al. (2011) consider privacy in the context of empiri-
cal risk minimization; they analyze the release of classifiers, obtained via algorithms such as SVMs,
with (centralized) privacy constraints on the training data.Dwork and Lei (2009) study algorithms
for privacy-preserving regression under the centralized model; these however require running time
which is exponential in the data dimension. Smith (2011) obtains private, asymptotically-optimal
algorithms for statistical estimation, again though, in the centralized model.
More recently, Duchi et al. (2013) consider the problem of finding minimax rates for statisti-
cal estimators under local-DP. Their techniques are based on refined analysis of information the-
oretic quantities, including generalizations of the Fano’s Inequality bounds we use in Section 3.1.
However, the estimation problems they consider have a simpler structure – in particular, they in-
volve learning from samples generated directly from an underlying model (albeit privatized). What
makes our setting challenging is the combination of a generative model (the bipartite stochastic
blockmodel) with incomplete information (due to user-item sampling) – it seems unlikely that the
techniques of Duchi et al. (2013) can extend easily to our setting. Moreover, lower bound techniques
do not naturally yield good algorithms
Other Notions of Privacy: The local-DP model which we consider has been studied before in pri-
vacy literature (Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008); Dwork et al. (2006)) and statistics (Warner (1965)).
It is a stronger notion than central differential privacy, and also stronger than two other related no-
tions: pan-privacy (Dwork et al. (2010b)) where the database has to also deal with occasional release
of its state, and privacy under continual observations (Dwork et al. (2010a)), where the database
must deal with additions and deletions, while maintaining privacy.
Recommendation algorithms based on incoherence: Apart from privacy-preserving algorithms,
there is a large body of work on designing recommender systems under various constraints (usually
low-rank) on the ratings matrix (for example, Wainwright (2009); Keshavan et al. (2010)). These
methods, though robust, fail in the presence of privacy constraints, as the noise added as a result
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of privatization is much more than their noise-tolerance. This is intuitive, as successful matrix
completion would constitute a breach of privacy; our work builds the case for using simpler lower
dimensional representations of the data, and simpler algorithms based on extracting limited infor-
mation (in our case, 1-bit sketches) from each user.
2. Preliminaries
We now present our system model, formally define different notions of differential privacy, and
introduce some tools from information theory that form the basis of our proofs.
2.1. The Bipartite Stochastic BlockModel
Recommender system typically assume the existence of an underlying low-dimensional generative
model for the data – the aim then is to learn parameters of this model, and then, use the learned model
to infer unknown user-item rankings. In this paper we consider a model wherein items and users be-
long to underlying clusters, and a user’s ratings for an item depend only on the clusters they belong
to. This is essentially a bipartite version of the Stochastic Blockmodel Holland et al. (1983), widely
used in model selection literature. The aim of the recommendation algorithm is to learn these clus-
ters, and then reveal them to the users, who can then compute their own recommendations privately.
Our model, though simpler than the state of the art in recommender systems, is still rich enough
to account for many of the features seen empirically in recommender systems. In addition it yields
reasonable accuracy in non-private settings on meaningful datasets (c.f. Tomozei and Massoulié
(2011)).
Formally, let [U ] be the set of U users and [N ] the set of N items. The set of users is divided
into K clusters [K], where cluster i contains αiU users. Similarly, the set of items is divided
into L clusters [L], where cluster ℓ contains βℓN items. We use A to denote the (incomplete)
matrix of user/item ratings, where each row corresponds to a user, and each column an item. For
simplicity, we assume Aij ∈ {0, 1}; for example, this could correspond to ‘like/dislike’ ratings.
Finally we have the following statistical assumption for the ratings – for user u ∈ [U ] with user
class k, and item i ∈ [N ] with item class ℓ, the rating Aui is given by a Bernoulli random variable
Aui ∼ Bernoulli(bkℓ). Ratings for different user-item pairs are assumed independent.
In order to model limited information, i.e., the fact that users rate only a fraction of all items, we
define a parameter w to be the number of items a user has rated. More generally, we only need to
know w in an orderwise sense – for example, w = Θ(f(N)) for some function f . We assume that
the rated items are picked uniformly at random. We define w = Ω(N) to be the information-rich
regime, and w = o(N) to be the information-scarce regime.
Given this model, the aim of the recommender system is to learn the item-clusters from user-
item ratings. Note that the difficulty in doing so is twofold:
• The user-item ratings matrix A is incomplete – in particular, each user has ratings for only w
out of N items.
• Users share their information only via a privacy-preserving mechanism (as we discuss in the
next section).
Our work exposes how these two factors interact to affect the sample-complexity, i.e., the minimum
number of users required to learn the item-clusters. We note also that another difficulty in learning
is that the user-item ratings are noisy – however, as long as this noise does not depend on the number
of items, this does not affect the sample-complexity scaling.
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2.2. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a framework that defines conditions under which an algorithm can be said to
be privacy preserving with respect to the input. Formally (following Dwork (2006)):
Definition 1 (ǫ-Differential Privacy) A randomized function Ψ : X → Y that maps data X ∈ X
to Y ∈ Y is said to be ǫ-differentially private if, for all values y ∈ Y in the range space of Ψ, and
for all ‘neighboring’ data x, x′, we have:
P[Y = y|X = x]
P[Y = y|X = x′]
≤ eǫ (1)
We assume that Y conditioned on X is independent of any external side information Z (in other
words, the output of mechanism Ψ depends only on X and its internal randomness). The definition
of ‘neighboring’ is chosen according to the situation, and determines the data that remain private. In
the original definition Dwork (2006), two databases are said to be neighbors if the larger database is
constructed by adding a single tuple to the smaller database. In the context of ratings matrices, two
matrices can be neighbors if they differ in: i) a single row (per-user privacy), or ii) a single rating
(per-rating privacy).
Two crucial properties of differential privacy are composition and post-processing. We state
these here without proof; c.f. Dwork (2006) for details. Composition captures the reduction in
privacy due to sequentially applying multiple differentially-private release mechanisms:
Proposition 2 (Composition) If k outputs, {Y1, Y2, . . . , Yk} are obtained from data X ∈ X by k
different randomized functions, {Ψ1,Ψ2, . . . ,Ψk}, where Ψi is ǫi-differentially private, then the
resultant function is ∑ki=1 ǫi differentially private.
Post-processing states that processing the output of a differentially private release mechanism can
only make it more differentially private (i.e., with a smaller ǫ) vis-a-vis the input:
Proposition 3 (Post-processing) If a function Ψ1 : X → Y is ǫ-differentially private, then any
composition function Ψ2 ◦Ψ1 : X → Z is ǫ′-differentially private for some ǫ′ ≤ ǫ.
In settings where the database curator is untrusted, an appropriate notion of privacy is local
differential privacy (or local-DP). For each user u, letXu be its private data – in the recommendation
context, the rated-item labels and corresponding ratings – and let Yu be the data that the user makes
publicly available to the untrusted curator. Local-DP requires that Yu is ǫ differentially private w.r.t.
Xu. This paradigm is similar to the Randomized Response technique in statistics Warner (1965).
It is the natural notion of privacy in the case of untrusted databases, as the data is privatized at the
user-end before storage in the database; to emphasize this, we alternately refer to it as User-end
Differential Privacy.
We conclude this section with a mechanism for releasing a single bit under ǫ-differential privacy.
Differential privacy for this mechanism is easy to verify using equation 1.
Proposition 4 (ǫ-DP bit release): Given bit S0 ∈ {0, 1}, set output S to be equal to S0 with
probability eǫ1+eǫ , else equal to S
0
= 1− S0. Then S is ǫ-differentially private w.r.t. S0.
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2.3. Preliminaries from Information Theory
For a random variable X taking values in some discrete space X , its entropy is defined as H(X) :=∑
x∈X −P[X = x] log P[X = x]
3
. For two random variables X,Y , the mutual information be-
tween them is given by:
I(X;Y ) :=
∑
(x,y)
P[X = x, Y = x] log
(
P[X = x, Y = y]
P[X = x]P[Y = y]
)
.
Our main tools for constructing lower bounds are variants of Fano’s Inequality, which are
commonly used in non-parametric statistics literature (c.f. Santhanam and Wainwright (2009);
Wainwright (2009)). Consider a finite hypothesis class H, |H| = M , indexed by [M ]. Suppose
that we choose a hypothesis H uniformly at random from {1, 2, . . . ,M}, sample a data set XU1
of U samples drawn in an i.i.d. manner according to a distribution PH(H) (in our case, u ∈ [U ]
corresponds to a user, and Xu the ratings drawn according to the statistical model in Section 2.1),
and then provide a private version of this data X̂U1 to the learning algorithm. We can represent this
as the Markov chain:
H ∈ H
Sampling
−−−−−−−→ XU1
Privatization
−−−−−−−−−→ X̂U1
Model
−−−−−−→
Selection
Ĥ
Further, we define a given learning algorithm to be unreliable for the hypothesis class H if for a
hypothesis drawn uniformly at random, we have maxh∈[M ] P
[
Ĥ 6= H|H = h
]
> 12 .
Fano’s inequality provides a lower bound on the probability of error under any learning algo-
rithm in terms of the mutual information between the underlying hypotheses and the samples. A
basic version of the inequality is as follows:
Lemma 5 (Fano’s Inequality) Given a hypothesis H drawn uniformly from H, and U samples XU1
drawn according to H , for any learning algorithm, the average probability of error Pe := P[Ĥ 6=
H] satisfies:
Pe ≥ 1−
I(H;XU1 ) + 1
log (M)
. (2)
As a direct consequence of this result, if the samples are such that I(H;XU1 ) = o(logM), then
any algorithm fails to correctly identify almost all of the possible underlying models. Though this is
a weak bound, equation 2 turns out to be sufficient to study sample-complexity scaling in the cases
we consider. In Appendix A, we consider stronger versions of the above lemma, as well as more
general criterion for approximate model selection (e.g., allowing for distortion).
3. Item-Clustering under Local-DP: The Information-Rich Regime
In this section, we derive a basic lower bound on the number of users needed for accurate learning
under local differential privacy. This relies on a simple bound on the mutual information between
any database and its privatized output, and hence is applicable in general settings. Returning to item-
clustering, we give an algorithm that matches the optimal scaling (up to logarithmic factor) under
one of the following two conditions: i) w = Ω(N), i.e., each user has rated a constant fraction of
items (the information-rich regime), or ii) only the ratings are private, not the identity of the rated
items.
3. For notational convenience, we use log(·) as the logarithm to the base 2 throughout; hence, the entropy is in ‘bits’
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3.1. Differential Privacy and Mutual Information
We first present a lemma that characterizes the mutual information leakage across any differentially
private channel:
Lemma 6 Given (private) r.v. X ∈ X , a privatized output Y ∈ Y obtained by any locally ǫ−DP
mechanism Φ : X → Y , and any side information Z , we have: I(X;Y |Z) ≤ ǫ log e.
Lemma 6 follows directly from the definitions of mutual information and differential privacy
(note that for any such mechanism, the output Y given the input X is conditionally independent of
any side-information). We note that similar results have appeared before in literature; for example,
equivalent statements appear in McGregor et al. (2010); Alvim et al. (2011). We present the proof
here for the sake of completeness:
Proof [Proof of Lemma 6]
I(X;Y |Z) =
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
p(x, y|Z) log
[
p(x, y|Z)
p(x|Z)p(y|Z)
]
=
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
p(x, y|Z) log
[
p(y|x,Z)∑
x′∈X p(x
′|Z)p(y|x′, Z)
]
=
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
−p(x, y|Z) log
[∑
x′∈X
p(x′|Z)
p(y|x′, Z)
p(y|x,Z)
]
(a)
≤
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
−p(x, y|Z) log
[∑
x′∈X
p(x′|Z)e−ǫ
]
≤ ǫ log e.
Here inequality (a) is a direct application of the definition of differential privacy (Equation 1), and
in particular, the fact that it holds for any side information.
Returning to the private learning of item classes, we obtain a lower bound on the sample-
complexity by considering the following special case of the item-clustering problem: consider
H = {0, 1}N , and let CN ∈ H be a mapping of the item set [N ] to two classes represented as
{0, 1} – hence the size of the hypothesis class is 2N . Each user u has some private data Xu, which
is generated via the bipartite Stochastic Blockmodel (c.f., Section 2.1). Recall we define a learning
algorithm to be unreliable for H if maxh∈H P
[
ĈN 6= CN |CN = h
]
> 12 . Using Lemma 6 and
Fano’s inequality (Lemma 5), we get the following lower bound on the sample-complexity:
Theorem 7 Suppose the underlying clustering CN is drawn uniformly at random from {0, 1}N .
Then any learning algorithm obeying ǫ-local-DP is unreliable if the number of queries satisfies:
U <
(
N
ǫ log e
)
.
Proof We now have the following information-flow model for each user (under local-DP):
CN
Sampling
−−−−−−−→ Xu
Privatization
−−−−−−−−−→ X̂u
9
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Here sampling refers to each user rating a subset of w items. Now by using the Data-Processing
Inequality (Theorem 2.8.1 from Cover and Thomas (2006)), followed by Lemma 6, we have that:
I(CN ; X̂
U
1 ) ≤
U∑
u=1
I(Xu; X̂u|
̂
X
u−1
1 ) < Uǫ log e,
Fano’s inequality (Lemma 5) then implies that a learning algorithm is unreliable if the number of
queries satisfies: U <
(
N
ǫ log e
)
.
We note here that the above theorem, though stated for the bipartite Stochastic Blockmodel, in fact
gives sample-complexity bounds for more general model-selection problems. Further, in Appendix
A, we extend the result to allow for distortion – wherein the algorithm is allowed to make a mistake
on some fraction of item-labels.
For the bipartite Stochastic Blockmodel, though the above bound is not the tightest, it turns out
to be achievable (up to log factors) in the information-rich regime, as we show next. We note that a
similar bound was given by Beimel et al. (2010) for PAC-learning under centralized DP, using more
explicit counting techniques. Both our results and the bounds in Beimel et al. (2010) fail to exhibit
the correct scaling in the information-scarce case (w = o(N)) setting. However, unlike proofs based
on counting arguments, our method allows us to leverage more sophisticated information theoretic
tools for other variants of the problem, like those we consider subsequently in Section 4.
3.2. Item-Clustering in the Information-Rich Regime
To conclude this section, we outline an algorithm for clustering in the information-rich regime. The
algorithm proceeds as follows: i) the recommendation algorithm provides each user u with two
items (iu, ju) picked at random, whereupon the user computes a private sketch S0u which is equal to
1 if she rated the two items positively, and else 0, ii) users release a privatized version Su of their
private sketch using the ǫ-DP bit release mechanism, iii) the algorithm constructs matrix Â, where
Â(i, j) entry is obtained by adding the sketches from all users queried with item-pair (i, j), and
finally iv) performs spectral clustering of items based on matrix Â. This algorithm, which we refer
to as the Pairwise-Preference algorithm, is formally specified in Figure 1.
Recall in the bipartite Stochastic Blockmodel, we assume that the U users belong tp K clusters,
each of size αiU . We now have the following theorem that characterizes the performance of the
Pairwise-Preference algorithm.
Theorem 8 The Pairwise-Preference algorithm satisfies ǫ-local-DP. Further, suppose the eigenval-
ues and eigenvectors of Â satisfy the following non-degeneracy conditions:
• The L largest magnitude eigenvalues of A have distinct absolute values.
• The corresponding eigenvectors y1, y2, . . . , yL, normalized under the α-norm, ||y||2α =
∑K
k=1 αky
2
k,
for some α satisfy:
ti 6= tj , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ L
where ti := (y1(i), . . . , yL(i)).
Then, in the information-rich regime (i.e., when w = Ω(N)), there exists c > 0 such that the item
clustering is successful with high probability if the number of users satisfies:
U ≥ c (N logN) .
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Setting: Items [N ], Users [U ]. Each user has set of w ratings (Wu, Ru),Wu ∈ [N ]w, Ru ∈ {0, 1}w .
Each item i associated with a cluster CN (i) ∈ [L].
Return: Cluster labels {CN (i)}i∈[N ]
Stage 1 (User sketch generation):
• For each user u ∈ [U ], pick items Pu = {iu, ju}:
– At random if w = Ω(N)
– If Wu is known, pick two random rated items.
• User u generates a private sketch S0u given by:
S0u(Pu, Ru) =
{
1 : Ru(iu) = Ru(ju)
0 : otherwise
,
where R̂ui = Rui if i ∈Wu, and 0 otherwise.
Stage 2 (User sketch privatization):
Each user u ∈ [U ] releases privatized sketch Su from S0u using the ǫ-DP bit release mechanism
(Proposition 4).
Stage 3 (Spectral Clustering):
• Generate a pairwise-preference matrix Â, where:
Âij =
∑
u∈U|Pu={i,j}
Su
• Extract the top L normalized eigenvectors x1, x2, . . . , xL (corresponding to L largest eigen-
values of Â).
• Project each row of Â into the L-dimensional profile space of the top eigenvectors.
• Perform k-means clustering in the profile space to get the item clusters
Figure 1: The Pairwise-Preference Algorithm
Proof [Proof Outline] Local differential privacy under the Pairwise-Preference algorithm is guaran-
teed by the use of ǫ-DP bit release, and the composition property. The performance analysis is based
on a result on spectral clustering by Tomozei and Massoulié (2011). The main idea is to interpret
Â as representing the edges of a random graph over the item set, with an edge between an item in
class i and another in class j if Âij > 0. In particular, from the definition of the Pairwise Preference
algorithm, we can compute that the probability of such an edge is Θ
(
bij logN
N
)
. This puts us in
the setting analyzed by Tomozei and Massoulié (2011) – we can now use their spectral clustering
bounds to get the result. For the complete proof, refer Appendix B.
4. Local-DP in the Information-Scarce Regime: Lower Bounds
As in the previous lower bound, we consider a simplified version of the problem, where there is
a single class of users, and each item is ranked either 0 or 1 deterministically by each user (i.e.,
bui = bi ∈ {0, 1} for all items). Let CN (·) : [N ]→ {0, 1} be the underlying clustering function; in
general we can think of this as an N -bit vector Z ∈ {0, 1}N . We assume that the user-data for user
u is given by Xu = (Iu, Zu), where Iu is a size w subset of [N ] representing items rated by user
11
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u, and Zu are the ratings for the corresponding items; in this case, Zu = {Z(i)}i∈Iu . The set Iu is
assumed to be chosen uniformly at random from amongst all size-w subsets of [N ]. We also denote
the privatized sketch from user u as Su ∈ S . Here the space S to which sketches belong is assumed
to be an arbitrary finite or countably infinite space. The sketch is assumed ǫ-differentially private.
Finally, as before, we assume that Z is chosen uniformly over {0, 1}N . Thus we have the following
information-flow model for the user u:
Z
Sampling
−−−−−−−→ (Iu, Zu)
Privatization
−−−−−−−−−→ Su
Now to get tighter lower bounds on the number of users needed for accurate item clustering,
we need more accurate bounds on the mutual information between the underlying model on item-
clustering and the data available to the algorithm. The main idea behind our lower bound techniques
is to view the above chain as a combination of two channels – the first wherein the user-data (Iu, Zu)
is generated (sampled) by the underlying statistical model, and the second wherein the algorithm
receives a sketch Su of the user’s data. We then develop a new information inequality that allows
us to bound the mutual information in terms of the mismatch between the channels. This technique
turns out to be useful in settings without privacy as well – in Section 4.2, we show how it can be
used to get sample-complexity bounds for learning with 1-bit sketches.
4.1. Mutual Information under Channel Mismatch
We now establish a bound for the mutual information between a statistical model and a low-
dimensional sketch, which is the main tool we use to get sample-complexity lower bounds. We
define [N ]w to be the collection of all size-w subsets of [N ], and D := [N ]w ×{0, 1}w to be the set
from which user information (i.e., (I, Z)) is drawn, and define D = |D| = (Nw)2w. Finally EX [·]
indicates that the expectation is over the random variable X.
Lemma 9 Given the Markov Chain Z → (I, Z) → S, let (I1, Z1), (I2, Z2) ∈ D be two pairs
of ‘user-data’ sets which are independent and identically distributed according to the conditional
distribution of the pair (I, Z) given S = s. Then, the mutual information I(Z;S) satisfies:
I(Z;S) ≤ ES
[
E(I1,Z1)|S⊥⊥(I2,Z2)|S
[
2|I1∩I2|1{Z1≡Z2} − 1
]]
,
where we use the notation 1{Z1≡Z2} to denote that the two user-data sets are consistent on the index
set on which they overlap, i.e., 1{Z1≡Z2} := 1{Z1(ℓ)=Z2(ℓ)∀ℓ∈I1∩I2}
Proof For brevity, we use the shorthand notation p(z) = P[Z = z], p(s) = P[S = s], p(z|s) =
P[Z = z|S = s] and finally p(z, s) = P[(Z, S) = (z, s)]. Now we have:
I(Z;S) =
∑
z,s
p(z, s) log
(
p(z, s)
p(z)p(s)
)
=
∑
s
∑
z
p(z|s)p(s) log
(
p(z|s)
p(z)
)
≤ ES
[∑
z
p(z|s) log
(
p(z|s)
p(z)
)]
(3)
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Let f(s, z) := log
(
p(z,s)
p(z)
)
. Similar to above, we use the shorthand notation p(·|a, b) := P[·|A =
a,B = b], where (A,B) are random variables and (a, b) their corresponding realizations. Now we
have:
f(s, z) = log
(
p(z|s)
p(z)
)
= log
(∑
(i2,z2)
p(z, i2, z2|s)
p(z)
)
(Summing over (I2, Z2))
= log
(∑
(i2,z2)
p(z|i2, z2, s)p(i2, z2|s)
p(z)
)
= log
(∑
(i2,z2)
p(z|i2, z2)p(i2, z2|s)
p(z)
)
(By the Markov property)
≤
∑
(i2,z2)
p(z|i2, z2)p(i2, z2|s)
p(z)
− 1
(Since log(x) ≤ x− 1)
=
∑
(i2,z2)
p(i2, z2|s)2
|i2|1{z≡z2} − 1, (4)
where the last equality is obtained using the fact that the type of each item Z(l) is independent and
uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. Next, using a similar set of steps, we have:∑
z
p(z|s)f(s, z) =
∑
z
∑
i1
p(z, i1|s)f(s, z)
=
∑
i1,z1
∑
z−i1
p(i1, z1|s)P[Z−I1 = z−i1 |i1, z1]f(s, z)(
Where Z−i1 := {Z(l)|l ∈ [N ] \ i1} ∈ {0, 1}N−|i1|
)
=
∑
i1,z1
∑
z−i1
p(i1, z1|s)2
−(N−|i1|)f(s, z), (5)
Finally, we combine equations (3),(4) and (5) together to get the result:
I(Z;S) ≤ ES
[∑
z
P[Z = z|S = s]f(s, z)
]
≤ ES
 ∑
(i1,z1)
∑
z−i1
p(i1, z1|s)2
−(N−|i1|)
 ∑
(i2,z2)
p(i2, z2|s)2
|i2|1{z≡z2} − 1

= ES
 ∑
(i1,z1)
∑
(i2,z2)
p(i1, z1|s)p(i2, z2|s)2
−(N−|i1|−|i2|)
∑
z−i1
1{(z1,z−i1)≡z2}
− 1

= ES
[
E(I1,Z1)|S⊥⊥(I2,Z2)|S
[
2|I1∩I2|1{Z1≡Z2} − 1
]]
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We note here that the above lemma is a special case (where Z takes the uniform measure over
{0, 1}N ) of a more general lemma, which we state and prove in Appendix C
4.2. Sample-Complexity for Learning with 1-bit Sketches
To demonstrate the use of Lemma 9, we first consider a related problem that demonstrates the effect
of per-user constraints (as opposed to average constraints) on the mutual information. We consider
the same item-class learning problem as before with w = 1 (i.e., each user has access to a single
rating), but instead of a privacy constraint, we consider a ‘per-user bandwidth’ constraint, wherein
each user can communicate only a single bit to the learning algorithm.
Theorem 10 Suppose w = 1, with (I, Z) drawn i.i.d uniformly over [N ] × {0, 1}. Then for any
1-bit sketch derived from (I, Z), it holds that: I(Z, S) = O ( 1N ) , and consequently, there exists
a constant c > 0 such that any cluster learning algorithm using queries with 1-bit responses is
unreliable if the number of users satisfies U < cN2.
Proof In order to use Lemma 9, we first note that I(Z, S) is a convex function of P[S = s|Z = z]
for fixed P[Z = z] (Theorem 2.7.4 in Cover and Thomas (2006)). Writing P[S = s|Z = z] as∑
(i,z) P[S = s|(I, Z) = (i, z)]P[(I, Z) = (i, z)|Z = z], we observe that the extremal points of the
kernel P[S = s|Z = z] correspond to P[S = s|(i, z)] ∈ {0, 1}, where the mutual information is
maximized. This implies that the class of deterministic queries with 1-bit response that maximizes
mutual information has the following structure: given user-data (Iu, Zu), the algorithm provides
user u with an arbitrary set A ⊆ {(i, z)|i ∈ [N ], z ∈ {0, 1}} of (items,ratings), and the user
identifies if (Iu, Zu) is contained in A. Formally, the query is denoted Su = 1A(Iu, Zu) (i.e., is
(Iu, Zu) ∈ A?).
Defining psi,z := P[(I, Z) = (i, z)|S = s], for a query response S = 1A(Iu, Zu), we have the
following:
p1i,z =
P[[(I, Z) = (i, z)]P[S = 1|(i, z)]∑
(j,z′j)
P[(I, Z) = (j, z′j)]P[S = 1|(j, z
′
j)]
=
1A(i, z)∑N
j=1 {1A(j, 0) + 1A(j, 1)}
=
1A(i, z)
|A|
,
and similarly p0i,z =
1A¯(i,z)
|A¯|
where A¯ is the complement of set A. From Lemma 9, for r.v.s
(I1, Z1) ⊥⊥ (I2, Z2)|S, we have:
I(Z, S) ≤ ES
[
E
[
2|I1∩I2|1{Z1≡Z2} − 1
]]
=
∑
s∈{0,1}
P[S = s]E
[
1{I1=I2}
(
21{Z1≡Z2} − 1
)]
.
Introducing the notation P(I = ℓ, Z(ℓ) = σ|S = s) = πsℓ,σ , the following identity is easily
established:
N∑
ℓ=1
E
[
1{I1=I2=ℓ}(21{Z1(ℓ)=Z2(ℓ)} − 1)|S = s
]
=
N∑
ℓ=1
(
πsℓ,0 − π
s
ℓ,1
)2 (6)
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The RHS of (6) is a non-negative definite quadratic form of the variables psi,z (since πsℓ,σ =
∑
i,σ|ℓ∈i,z(ℓ)=σ p
s
i,z).
Thus:
I(Z, S) ≤
∑
s∈{0,1}
P[S = s]
N∑
ℓ=1
(
πsℓ,0 − π
s
ℓ,1
)2
=
∑
s∈{0,1}
P[S = s]
1
|As|2
N∑
i=1
1{|As∩{(i,0),(i,1)}|=1},
where As = A if s = 1 and A¯ if s = 0. Now for a given A, consider the partitioning of the set [N ]
into C0 ∪ C1 ∪ C2, where for k = 1, 2, 3, ∀i ∈ Ck, |A ∩ {(i, 0), (i, 1)}| = k. We then have the
following:
I(Z, S) ≤ P[S = 1]
|C1|
|A|2
+ P[S = 0]
|C1|
|A¯|2
=
|A|
2N
|C1|
|A|2
+
|A¯|
2N
|C1|
|A¯|2
(Since S = 1A(I, Z))
=
|C1|
2N
(
1
|A|
+
1
2N − |A|
)
≤
1
N
.
Now, using Fano’s inequality (Lemma 5) to get the result.
Note that the above bound is tight – to see this, consider a (adaptive) scheme where each user
is asked a random query of the form “Is (Iu, Zu) = (i, b)?”(where i ∈ [N ] and b = {0, 1}). The
average time between two successful queries is 2N , and one needs N successful queries to learn
all the bits. This demonstrates an interesting change in the sample-complexity of learning with
per-user communications constraints (1-bit sketches in this section, privacy in next section) versus
average-user constraints (mutual information bound or average bandwidth).
4.3. Sample-Complexity for Learning under Local-DP
We now exploit the above techniques to obtain lower bounds on the scaling required for accurate
clustering with DP in an information-scarce regime, i.e., when w = o(N). To do so, we first require
a technical lemma that establishes a relation between the distribution of a random variable with and
without conditioning on a differentially private sketch:
Lemma 11 Given a discrete random variable A ∈ A and some ǫ-differentially private ‘sketch’
variable S ∈ S generated from A, there exists a function λ : A × S → [e−ǫ, eǫ] such that for any
a ∈ A and s ∈ S:
P(A = a|S = s) = P(A = a)λ(a, s) (7)
Proof
P(A = a|S = s) =
P(A = a)P(S = s|A = a)∑
a′∈A P(A = a
′)P(S = s|A = a′)
(From Bayes’ Theorem)
= P(A = a)
(∑
a′∈A
P(A = a′)
P(S = s|A = a′)
P(S = s|A = a)
)−1
15
BANERJEE HEGDE MASSOULIÉ
Thus, we can define:
λ(a, s) =
(∑
a′∈A
P(A = a′)
P(S = s|A = a′)
P(S = s|A = a)
)−1
.
Further, from the definition of ǫ-DP, we have:
e−ǫ ≤
P(S = s|A = a′)
P(S = s|A = a)
≤ eǫ,
and hence we have λ(a, s) ∈ [e−ǫ, eǫ], ∀ a ∈ A, s ∈ S .
Recall we define D := [N ]w × {0, 1}w to be the set from which user information (I, Z) is
drawn. We write P0 for the base probability distribution on (I1, Z1) and (I2, Z2) (note: the two
are i.i.d uniform) over D, and denote by E0 mathematical expectation under P0. We also need the
following estimate (c.f. Appendix C for the proof):
Lemma 12 If w = o(N), then:∣∣∣∣∣
(N−w
w
)(N
w
) − (1− w2
N
)∣∣∣∣∣ = Θ
(
w4
N2
)
We can prove our tightened bounds. We first obtain a weak lower bound in Theorem 13, valid for
all w, and then refine it in Theorem 14 under additional conditions.
Theorem 13 In the information-scarce regime, i.e., when w = o(N), under ǫ-local-DP we have:
I(Z, S) = O
(
w2
N
)
and consequently, there exists a constant c > 0 such that any cluster learning algorithm with ǫ-
local-DP is unreliable if the number of users satisfies U < c
(
N2
w2
)
.
Proof To bound the mutual information between the underlying model and each private sketch, we
use Lemma 9. In particular, we show that the mutual information is bounded by
(
w2
N
)
for any given
value s of the private sketch.
Consider any sketch realization S = s. Now, we have:
E
[
2|I1∩I2|1{Z1≡Z2} − 1
]
≤ E
[
1{Z1≡Z2}
(
2|I1∩I2| − 1
)]
The RHS of the above equation is a non-negative quadratic function of the variables {pi,z}(i,z)∈D,
where pi,z := P[(I, Z) = (i, z)|S = s]}. Now, using Lemma 11, we get:
E
[
2|I1∩I2|1{Z1≡Z2} − 1
]
≤ e2ǫE0
[
1{Z1≡Z2}
(
2|I1∩I2| − 1
)]
= e2ǫ
w∑
k=0
E
0
[
1{|I1∩I2|=k}1{Z1≡Z2}
(
2|I1∩I2| − 1
)]
= e2ǫ
w∑
k=0
E
0
[
1{|I1∩I2|=k}2
−k
(
2k − 1
)]
= e2ǫ(∆1 +∆2),
16
PRICE OF PRIVACY
where we define:
∆1 =
1
2
E
0
[
1{|I1∩I2|=1}
]
,
∆2 = E
0
[
1|I1∩I2|>1
(
1− 2−|I1∩I2|
)]
Now we bound each of these terms separately. For ∆1:
∆1 =
1
2
E
0
[
1{|I1∩I2|=1}
]
=
1
2
N∑
ℓ=1
E
0
[
1{I1∩I2={ℓ}}
]
=
w
(N−w
w−1
)
2
(N
w
)
=
w2
2(N − 2w + 1)
(
1−
w2
N
+O
(
w4
N2
))
(Using Lemma 12)
=
w2
2(N − 2w + 1)
(
1−
w2
N
+O
(
w4
N2
))
= O
(
w2
N
)
(8)
Similarly for ∆2, we have:
∆2 ≤ E
0
[
1{|I1∩I2|>1}
]
= 1− P0 [|I1 ∩ I2| < 2]
= 1−
(N−w
w
)
+ w
(N−w
w−1
)(
N
w
)
= 1−
(
1 +
w2
N − 2w + 1
) (N−w
w
)(
N
w
)
= 1−
(
1 +
w2
N − 2w + 1
)(
1−
w2
N
−O
(
w4
N2
))
= O
(
w4
N2
)
· (9)
Combining equations (8) and (9), we get the result.
The above result shows how Lemma 9 can be used to obtain sharper bounds on the mutual infor-
mation contained in a differentially private sketch in the information-scarce setting in comparison
to Lemma 6. Theorem 13 gives a lower bound of Ω(N2
w2
) on the number of samples needed to learn
the underlying clustering. Observe however that the dominant term in the above proof is the bound
on ∆1 – a more careful analysis of this leads to the following stronger bound:
Theorem 14 Under the scaling assumption w = o(N1/3), and for ǫ < ln(2), it holds that
I(Z, S) = O
(w
N
)
·
and thus there exists a constant c > 0 such that any cluster learning algorithm with ǫ-local-DP is
unreliable if the number of users satisfies U < c
(
N2
w
)
.
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The proof of Theorem 14 is much more technical than that of Theorem 13 – we provide an
outline below, and defer the complete proof to Appendix C.
Proof [Proof Outline] Starting from Lemma 9, we first perform a decomposition of the bound. For
any S = s, we establish:
EE
[
2|I1∩I2|1{Z1≡Z2} − 1
]
≤
N∑
ℓ=1
E
[
1{ℓ∈I1∩I2}(2 ∗ 1Z1(ℓ)=Z2(ℓ) − 1)
]
+O
(
w4
N2
)
(10)
Under the scaling assumption w = o(N1/3), the second term in the right-hand side of the above
equation is o(w/N), and we only need to establish that the first term in the right-hand side is
O(w/N). Using the notation P(ℓ ∈ I, Z(ℓ) = σ|S = s) = πℓ,σ, we establish the following:
N∑
ℓ=1
E1{ℓ∈I1∩I2}
(
21Z1(ℓ)=Z2(ℓ) − 1
)
=
N∑
ℓ=1
(πℓ,0 − πℓ,1)
2 .
Now defining pi,z := P(I = i, Z = z|S = s) we have πℓ,σ =
∑
i,σ|ℓ∈i,z(ℓ)=σ pi,z. We formulate the
problem of upper-bounding the first term on the right-hand side of (10) as the following optimization
problem:
Maximize
{pi,z}(i,z)∈D
N∑
ℓ=1
(πℓ,0 − πℓ,1)
2
Subject to
∑
(i,z)∈D
pi,z = 1, pi,zD ∈
[
1− ǫ′, 1 + ǫ′
]
.
Where ǫ′ = max(eǫ − 1, 1 − e−ǫ), and the constraint is derived from the ǫ-DP definition.
We first establish that the extremal points of the above convex set consist of the distributions
pAi,z indexed by the sets A ⊂ D of cardinality D/2, defined by pAi,z = 1+ǫ
′
D if (i, z) ∈ A and
1−ǫ′
D otherwise. We then show that for each such A,
∑N
ℓ=1
(
πAℓ,0 − π
A
ℓ,1
)2
≤ O(w/N), where
πAℓ,σ =
∑
i:ℓ∈i
∑
z:z(ℓ)=σ p
A
i,z.
Significantly, however, the bound in Theorem 14 matches the performance of the MaxSense
algorithm, which we present next, thereby showing that it is tight.
5. Local-DP in the Information-Scarce Regime: The MaxSense Algorithm
The Pairwise-Preference algorithm of Section 3, although orderwise optimal in the information-rich
regime, is highly suboptimal in the information-scarce setting. In particular, note that the probability
that two randomly probed items have been rated by the user is O(w2/N2) – now, in order to obtain
the same guarantees as in the information-rich regime (where we needed Θ(N log(N)) samples to
learn the cluster labels), we now need Θ(N log(N) ·N2/w2) users – this however is polynomially
larger than our lower bounds from Section 4.
This suggests that in order to learn in an information-scarce regime, an algorithm needs to probe
or ‘sense’ a much larger set of items (intuitively, of the order of Nw ) in order to hit the set of watched
items with a non-vanishing probability. We now outline the MaxSense algorithm for cluster-learning
in the information-scarce regime, which is based on this intuition.
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As with Pairwise Preference, MaxSense uses (privatized) 1-bit sketches for learning – however
each sketch now aggregates ratings for several items. A query to user u is formed by constructing
a random sensing vector Hu = (Hui)i∈[N ], whose entries Hui = 1 if item i is being sensed, and 0
otherwise. Each item i is chosen for sensing (i.e. Hui is set to 1) in an i.i.d. manner with probability
θ/w (for some chosen constant θ > 0). User u then constructs a private sketch S0u, which is the
maximum of her ratings for items that are being sensed; as before, unrated items are given a rating
of 0. Formally, S0u = maxi∈[N ]HuiZui, where Zui is 1 if user u rated item i positively, else 0.
Finally, user u outputs a privatized version Su of S0u. The sensing vector Hu is assumed to be
known publicly.
Based on the sketches Su and sensing vectors Hu, the algorithm then determines a per-item
score given by Bi =
∑
u∈[U ]HunSu, n ∈ [N ]. Finally, it performs k-means clustering of these
scores in R. The algorithm is formally specified in Figure 2.
Setting: N items [N ], U users [U ]. User u has set of w ratings (Wu, Ru),Wu ∈ [N ]w, Ru ∈
{0, 1}w . Item i associated with cluster-label CN (i) ∈ [L].
Output: Cluster-labels of each item {CN (i)}i∈[N ]
Stage 1 (User sketch generation):
• For user u ∈ [U ], generate sensing vector Hu ∈ {0, 1}N , where Hui ∼ Bernoulli( θw ), i.i.d.
(for chosen θ).
• User u generates a private sketch S0u given by:
S0u(Wu, Ru,Hu) = max
i∈[N ]
HuiR̂ui
Where R̂ui = Rui if i ∈Wu, and 0 otherwise.
Stage 2 (User sketch privatization):
Each user u ∈ [U ] releases a privatized sketch Su from S0u using the ǫ-DP bit release mechanism
(c.f. Proposition 4).
Stage 3 (Item Clustering):
• For each item i ∈ [N ], compute score Bi
∑
u∈U HuiSu
• Perform k-means clustering (with k = L) on {Bi}i∈[N ].
Figure 2: The MaxSense Algorithm
Theorem 15 The MaxSense algorithm satisfies ǫ-local-DP. Further, let ǫ̂ = 2(eǫ−1)(eǫ+1) , and define:
δmin = min
1≤ℓ<ℓ′≤L
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
αke
−θ
∑L
ℓ=1 βℓbkℓ(bkℓ − bkℓ′)
∣∣∣∣∣
(where the item sensing probability is θ/w). Then for any d > 0, there exists a constant C > 0 such
that the clustering is successful with probability 1−N−d if the number of users satisfies:
U ≥ C
(
N2 logN
ǫ̂2δ2minw
)
. (11)
Before presenting the proof, we note that δmin encodes the required separability conditions for
successful clustering. In particular, let vk =
∑
ℓ βℓbkℓ – then it can be checked that δmin is strictly
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positive for all θ (except on a set of measure 0) provided the following holds:
∀ℓ 6= ℓ′ ∈ [L],∃k ∈ [K] such that
∑
j:vj=vk
αj(bjℓ − bjℓ′) 6= 0.
Designing algorithms with similar performance under weaker separability remains an open problem.
Proof We use k(u) to denote the user-cluster of user u and l(j) to denote the cluster of item j.
Privacy: For each user u, note that Hu is independent of the data (Wu, Ru). Next, given Hu, we
have that (Wu, Ru) → S0u → Su form a Markov chain, and hence it is sufficient (via the post-
processing property) to prove that S0u → Su satisfy ǫ-differential privacy. This however is a direct
consequence of using the ǫ-DP bit release mechanism.
Performance: An overview of the proof of correctness of MaxSense is as follows: First, we show
that for any item j, its count Bj concentrates around Bl(j), the expected count for its corresponding
cluster. Next, we compute the minimum separation ∆min between the expected counts for any two
item-clusters. Finally, we show that under the given scaling of users, each item count Bj is within
a distance ∆min/5 from Bl(j) w.h.p. This implies that any two items belonging to the same cluster
are within a distance of 2∆min/5, while two items of different clusters have a separation of at least
3∆min/5, thereby ensuring successful clustering.
First, let p = θw denote the sensing probability, and define:
q0k := P[S
0
u = 0|k(u) = k] =
∏
j∈[N ]
(
1−
pwbkl(j)
N
)
,
i.e., q0k is the probability that a user u of cluster k will have a (private) sketch S0u equal to 0. Then
we have:
log q0k =
N∑
j=1
log
(
1−
θbkj
N
)
=
L∑
l=1
βlN log
(
1−
θbkl
N
)
=
L∑
l=1
βlN
(
−
θbkl
N
+Θ
(
1
N2
))
= −θ
L∑
l=1
βlbkl +Θ
(
1
N
)
(12)
Thus log q0k ≥ −θ +Θ
(
1
N
)
, from which we have:
1
eθ
(
1 + Θ
(
1
N
))
≤ q0k ≤ 1,
Thus we see that for any user, the probability of the MaxSense sketch being 0 is Θ(1). Intuitively,
this means that each sketch has > 0 bits of information. We define q0 =
∑K
k=1 q
0
k (i.e., the proba-
bility that a random user’s sketch is 0).
Next, for any item i ∈ [N ], consider the item-score Bi =
∑
u∈U HuiSi. From the i.i.d sensing
property and the ǫ-DP bit release mechanism mechanism, we have:
E[Bi] =
∑
u∈U
E[HuiSu] =
U∑
u=1
p
[
E[1− S0u|Hui = 1]
eǫ + 1
+
eǫE[S0u|Hui = 1]
(eǫ + 1)
]
,
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Substituting ǫ̂ = 2(e
ǫ−1)
(eǫ+1) , we can expand the expression for E[Bi] as follows:
E[Bi] =
U∑
u=1
p
[
1
2
−
ǫ̂
4
+
ǫ̂
2
E
[
E[S0u|Hu]
∣∣Hui = 1]]
=
U∑
u=1
p
1
2
−
ǫ̂
4
+
ǫ̂
2
E
1− ∏
j∈[N ]
(
1−
wbujHuj
N
)∣∣∣∣∣∣Hui = 1

=
U∑
u=1
p
1
2
+
ǫ̂
4
−
ǫ̂
2
(
1−
wbui
N
)
E
∏
j 6=i
(
1−
wbujHuj
N
)
=
U∑
u=1
p
1
2
+
ǫ̂
4
−
ǫ̂
2
(
1−
wbk(u)l(i)
N
)∏
j 6=i
(
1− p+ p
(
1−
wbk(u)l(j)
N
))
(Using the i.i.d sensing properties of Hui)
=
K∑
k=1
αkUp
1
2
+
ǫ̂
4
−
ǫ̂
2
(
1−
wbkl(j)
N
)(
1−
pwbkl(i)
N
)−1 ∏
j∈[N ]
(
1−
pwbkl(j)
N
)
(Grouping terms by user and item classes.)
Note that we have dropped the explicit dependence on the user index and retained only the user-
cluster label. Similarly, we henceforth write k and l for k(i), l(j) respectively, whenever it does not
cause confusion in the notation. Thus we have:
E[Bi] = Up
[
1
2
+
ǫ̂
4
−
ǫ̂
2
K∑
k=1
αkq
0
k
(
1−
wbkl(i)
N
)(
1−
pwbkl(i)
N
)−1]
= Up
1
2
+
ǫ̂
4
−
ǫ̂
2
K∑
k=1
αkq
0
k
1− w(1−p)N bkl(i)(
1−
pwbkl(i)
N
)

= Up
[
1
2
+
ǫ̂
4
−
ǫ̂
2
K∑
k=1
αkq
0
k
]
+ Up
(w − θ)
N
ǫ̂
2
K∑
k=1
αkq
0
kbkl(i)(
1− θN bkl(i)
)
Now, noting that E[Bi] only depends on the class l(i) of item i, we define Bl = E[Bi|l(i) = l].
Then we have:
Bl = Up
[
1
2
+
ǫ̂
4
−
ǫ̂
2
q0
]
+ Up
(w − θ)
N
ǫ̂
2
K∑
k=1
αkq
0
kbkl(
1− θbklN
)
Recall w = o(N), and ǫ̂ < 1 – hence, for sufficiently large N , we have that for all item classes
l ∈ [L]: Bl ≤ Up.
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Next, given any two distinct item classes l,m, we define ∆lm := E[|Bl −Bm|]. Then we have:
∆lm ≥ |E[Bl −Bm]| (By Jensen’s Inequality)
= Up
(w − θ)
N
ǫ̂
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
αkq
0
kbkl(
1− θbklN
) − K∑
k=1
αkq
0
kbkm(
1− θbkmN
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥
Uǫ̂(c− c2w−1)
N
δlm,
where we define (using equation 12):
δlm :=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
αkq
0
kbkl(
1− θbklN
) − K∑
k=1
αkq
0
kbkm(
1− θbkmN
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
αkq
0
k
(bkl − bkm)(
1− θbklN
)(
1− θbkmN
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
αk(bkl − bkm)e
−θ
∑L
l=1 βlbkl
∣∣∣∣∣
≥ δmin := min
1≤l<l′≤L
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
αk(bkl − bkl′)e
−θ
∑L
l=1 βlbkl
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Let ∆min := minl,m∈[L]2,l 6=m∆lm. Now, for a given item j, a standard Chernoff bound (applicable
since the sketches are independent and bounded) gives us that for any a > 0:
P[|Bj −Bl(j)| ≥ aBl(j)] ≤ 2 exp
(
−
a2
3
Bl(j)
)
Choose a = ∆min
5Bl(j)
. Then we have:
P
[
|Bj −Bl(j)| ≥
∆min
5
]
≤ 2 exp
(
−
∆2min
75Bl(j)
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−
(
∆2min
75Up
))
,
and by taking union bound over all items, we have:
P
[
sup
j∈[N ]
|Bj −Bl(j)| ≥
∆min
5
]
≤ exp
(
log 2N −
∆2min
75Up
)
≤ exp
(
log 2N −
Uwǫ̂2δ2min
75N2
)
,
where we have substituted p = cw . Now if we choose U as:
U =
(
75N2(log 2 + (1 + d) logN)
ǫ̂2δ2minwc
)
= Θ
(
N2 logN
ǫ̂2δ2minwc
)
,
then we have:
P
[
sup
j∈[N ]
|Bj −Bl(j)| ≥
∆min
5
]
≤
1
Nd
,
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Thus, if number of users scale as in (11), then clustering is successful with probability 1−N−d.
Theorem 15 demonstrates that MaxSense is sufficient to achieve optimal scaling in N (up to
logarithmic terms) under suitable separability condition. One problem is that MaxSense does not
achieve the optimal ‘privacy trade-off’, namely, a 1ǫ factor in required sample-complexity scaling.
To correct this, we propose the Multi-MaxSense algorithm, a generalization of Algorithm 2, wherein
we ask multiple MaxSense queries to each user.
In Multi-MaxSense, each query now has an associated privacy parameter of ǫQ , where Q is
the number of questions asked to a user – thus, for each user, we still maintain ǫ-local-DP via the
composition property (Proposition 2). Independence between the answers is ensured as follows:
first, for each user, we choose a random partition of [N ] into 1p sets, each of size Np; we pick
Q of these and present them to the user. Next, each user calculates Q sketches using these Q
sensing vectors, and reveals the privatized set of sketches (with each sketch revelation obeying
ǫ
Q -differential privacy. Finally, we compute and cluster the item-counts as before. Formally, the
algorithm is specified in Figure 3. Now we have the following theorem.
Setting: N items [N ]. U users [U ], each with data (Wu, Ru) ∈ [N ]w × {0, 1}w . Parameter Q.
Output: The cluster labels of each item, {CN (i)}i∈[N ]
Stage 1 (User sketch generation):
• For each user u ∈ [U ], generate Q sensing vectors H(u,q) ∈ {0, 1}N , where each vector is
generated by choosing Np items uniformly and without replacement. As before, p = 1w .
• User u generates Q private sketches S0(u,q) as in Algorithm 2
Stage 2 (User sketch privatization): Each user u ∈ [U ] releases Q privatized sketches, where each
sketch is generated using a ǫQ -private bit release mechanism (Proposition 4).
Stage 3 (Item Clustering):
• For each item i ∈ [N ], compute a count Bi =
∑
u∈U
∑
q∈[Q]H(u,q)iS(u,q)
• Perform k-means clustering using the counts {Bi}i∈[N ] with k = L.
Figure 3: The Multi-MaxSense Algorithm
Theorem 16 The Multi-MaxSense algorithm satisfies ǫ-local-DP. Further, suppose Q = ⌈ǫ⌉. Then
for any d > 0, there exists a constant c such that if the number of users satisfies:
U ≥ c
(
N2 logN
ǫδ2minw
)
,
then the clustering is successful with probability 1−N−d.
Proof
Privacy: Since each user reveals Q bits, and each bit is privatized using a ǫQ -DP mechanism, there-
fore for any user u, the Q user sketches {Su,q}Qq=1 and user data (Wu, Ru) satisfy ǫ-DP using the
composition property (Proposition 2). The remaining proof for the privacy of the learning algorithm
is as before, using the post-processing property.
Performance: To show the improved scaling, observe that:
1. Due to choice of sensing vectors, the probability of any probe for a item in any sensing vector
(i.e., H(u,q)i for some u ∈ [U ], q ∈ [Q], i ∈ [N ]) being set to 1 is p, i.i.d.
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2. Further, since the multiple sensing vectors given to a single user do not overlap, therefore the
sketches {Su,q}u,q are also independent.
Hence, the analysis in Algorithm 2 can be repeated with U being replaced with QU and ǫ being
replaced with ǫQ . Choosing Q = ⌈ǫ⌉ implies that we now have:
ǫ̂ =
2
(
exp
(
ǫ
⌈ǫ⌉
)
− 1
)
exp
(
ǫ
⌈ǫ⌉
)
+ 1
≥
2(e− 1)
e+ 2
Substituting these in equation 11, we get the condition for correct clustering w.h.p as:
U ≥ c′
(
N2 logN
ǫδ2minw
)
.
6. Lower Bounds under Adaptive Queries
The lower bounds of Section 4 applied to non-adaptive learning, where queries to users are per-
formed in parallel, without leveraging answers of users 1, . . . , u − 1 when querying user u. We
now extend these bounds to the adaptive setting, where we now assume that users are queried se-
quentially, and the query for the t-th user can be affected by the sketches St−a1 := {S1, . . . , St−1}
released by the t− 1 previous users. We now have the following sample-complexity lower bound:
Theorem 17 Assume w = 1, and items are uniformly clustered into one of two clusters {0, 1} (i.e.,
CN (·) is drawn uniformly at random from {0, 1}N ). If users’ responses satisfy ǫ-local-DP, then the
number of adaptive queries needed to learn the clustering CN (·) is Ω(N logN).
To prove this, we first need a generalization of Lemma 9. As the proof is similar to Lemma 9, we
defer it to Appendix C.
Lemma 18 Assume that under measure P, the set I of items sampled by a user is independent of
the type vector Z . Let ps(i, z) := P((I, ZI) = (i, z)|S = s), and for any subset j ⊂ [N ] let
pj(z) := P(Zj = z). Then the following holds:
I(Z;S = s) ≤
∑
i,z
∑
i′,z′
ps(i, z)ps(i
′, z′)
[
1{z≡z′}
pi∪i′(z ∪ z
′)
pi(z)pi′(z′)
− 1
]
.
Note that Lemma 18 does not make any assumption regarding the distribution of Z or of the user-
data (I, Z) – assuming Z is uniformly drawn from {0, 1}N , we get back Lemma 9.
Proof [Proof Outline for Theorem 17] We consider the system when T − 1 sketches have been
released, and denote by PT the probability distribution conditionally on the previously observed
sketch values. We want to develop bounds of the form I(Z;ST1 ) ≤ δT , for a suitable function
δT . These bounds are obtained inductively as follows. First, we can expand and bound the mutual
information as follows:
I(Z;ST1 ) =
T∑
t=1
I(Z;St|S
t−1
1 ) (13)
≤ I(Z;ST−11 ) + sup
s,sT−11
I(Z;ST = s|S
T−1
1 = s
T−1
1 ), (14)
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where I(U ;V = v|W = w) is the mutual information between U and V = v conditioned on
W = w.
Now consider any sequence {sT−11 , s}. We define PT to be the probability measure conditional
on ST−11 = s
T−1
1 , and pT+1(i, z) = PT+1[(I, Z) = (i, z)] and p
T+1
i (z) = P
T+1[Z(i) = z]. Using
Lemma 11, we have pT+1(i, zi) = fi(zi) 1N p
T
i (zi) where fi(zi) belongs to [1 − ǫ′, 1 + ǫ′] where
ǫ′ = eǫ − 1. Further, we can use Lemma 18 to obtain:
I(Z;ST = s|S
T−1
1 = s
T−1
1 ) ≤∑
i1,z1
∑
i2,z2
pT+1(i1, z1)p
T+1(i2, z2)
[
1z1≡z2
pTi1∪i2(z1 ∪ z2)
pTi1(z1)p
T
i2
(z2)
− 1
]
Combining and rearranging the above results, we get:
I(Z;ST = s|S
T−1
1 = s
T−1
1 ) ≤
1
N2
VarT
[
N∑
i=1
fi(Zi)
]
,
where VarT is defined w.r.t. the PT measure.
Next, let P0 be the unconditional probability, under which the Zi are i.i.d. uniform on {0, 1},
and define F :=
∑N
i=1 fi(Zi). Note that under P0, the random variable F has variance ≤ 2ǫ′2N –
a similar bound for VarT [F ] would yield an upper bound of order 1/N on I(Z;ST1 ). This appears
difficult, as the only information we have about PT is that the sketches ST1 are obtained via local-DP
mechanisms. However, we show that we can control VarT [F ] via controlling the mutual information
leakage. The crux of our argument is encapsulated in the following technical lemma:
Lemma 19 If I(Z;ST1 ) ≤ δ, then we have:
VarT [F ] ≤ Var0[F ] ·max {20, 10δ} .
Lemma 19 is of independent interest, and could enable extensions of our result (e.g. relaxing the
assumption that w = 1). For ease of exposition, we defer the proof to Appendix D. We instead now
show how to complete the proof of Theorem 17 via an induction argument.
Assume I(Z;ST1 ) ≤ δT – Lemma 19 now gives us that VarT [F ] ≤ Var0[F ] · max {20, 10δ}.
Now, using equation 13, we can recursively define δT+1 as:
δT+1 = δT +
1
N2
Var0[F ]max {20, 10δT } .
Recalling that Var0[F ] ≤ 2Nǫ′2, we can bound this as:
δT+1 ≤ δT +
C
N
max{1, δT },
where C := 40ǫ′2 is independent of N . It then follows that: δT = CT/N for T ≤ N/C , and for
T > N/C one has
δT ≤
(
1 +
C
N
)T
.
Thus for any fixed exponent α > 0, in order to learn Nα bits of information about the unknown
labels ZN1 , one needs at least T = α log(N)/ log(1 + C/N) = Ω(N logN) samples.
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We leave it as a topic for further research to establish how sharp this lower bound is. In particu-
lar, if it can be tightened to a lower bound of Ω(N2) and further extended to Ω(N2/w) for w 6= 1,
this would imply that MaxSense is optimal even when one can use adaptive queries. If on the other
hand there is a gap between non-adaptive and adaptive complexities, then this implies that schemes
superior to MaxSense in the adaptive case have yet to be identified.
7. Conclusion
We have initiated a study in the design of recommender systems under local-DP constraints. We
have provided lower bounds on the sample-complexity in both information-rich and information-
scarce regime, quantifying the effect of limited information on private learning. Further, we showed
tightness of these results by designing the MaxSense algorithm, which recovers the item clustering
under privacy constraints with optimal sample-complexity. The lower bound techniques naturally
extend to cover model selection for more general (finite) hypothesis classes, while 1-bit sketches
appear appropriate for designing efficient algorithms for the same. Development of such algorithms
and analysis of matching lower bounds by leveraging and extending the techniques we introduce
seem promising future research directions.
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Appendix A. Lower Bounds: Private Learning with Distortion
The item clustering problem fits in a more general framework of model selection from finite hypothesis-
classes, with local-DP constraints: we consider a hypothesis class H, |H| = M , indexed by [M ].
Given a hypothesis Z , samples XU1 are drawn in an i.i.d. manner according to some distribution
PH(Z) (in our case, u ∈ [U ] corresponds to a user, and Xu the ratings drawn according to the
statistical model in Section 2.1. PH(Z) thus includes both the sampling of items by a user, as well
as the ratings given for the sampled items). Let X̂U1 be a privatized version of this data, where
for each u ∈ [U ], the output X̂u is ǫ-differentially private with respect to the data Xu (by local-
DP). Note here that Xu and X̂u need not belong to the same space (for example, in the case of the
Multi-MaxSense algorithm, Xu is a subset of items and their ratings, while X̂u is the collection
of privatized responses to the multiple MaxSense queries). Note also that the probability transition
kernel PH can be known to the algorithm (although the exact model Z is unknown). Finally the
learning algorithm infers the underlying model from the privatized samples. We can represent this
as the Markov chain:
Z ∈ H
Sampling
−−−−−−−→ XU1
Privatization
−−−−−−−−−→ X̂U1
Model
−−−−−−→
Selection
Ẑ
In Section 3, we considered an algorithm to be successful only if Ẑ = Z , i.e., the model is identified
perfectly. A natural relaxation of this is in terms of a distortion metric, as follows: given a distance
function d : Z × Z → R+, we say the learner is successful if, for a given d > 0, we have:
d(Z, Ẑ) ≤ d.
For any h ∈ H, we define the set Bd(h) , {h′ ∈ H|d(h, h′) ≤ d}. Further, we define Md =
maxh∈H |Bd(h)| to be the largest size of such a set. Finally, given a distribution for Z , we define
the average error probability Pe for a learning algorithm for the hypothesis class H as:
Pe = P
[
d(Ẑ, Z) > d
]
.
Then we have the following bound on Pe:
Lemma 20 (Generalized Fano’s Inequality) Given a hypothesis Z drawn uniformly from H, for
any learning algorithm, the average error probability satisfies:
Pe ≥ 1−
I(Z; X̂U1 ) + 1
logM − logMd
.
Lemma 20 is standard in deriving lower bounds for model-selection with distortion constraints
– for example, refer Santhanam and Wainwright (2009). We present the proof for the sake of com-
pleteness:
Proof First, we define an error indicator E as:
E =
{
1 : d(Z, Ẑ) > d
0 : otherwise
,
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and hence Pe = P[E = 1]. Recall that the entropy is given by H(x) = −x log(x)− (1−x) log(1−
x). Now we have:
I(Z; X̂U1 ) ≥ I(Z; Ẑ) (By the Data Processing Inequality)
= H(Z)−H(Z|Ẑ)
≥ logM −H(Z|Ẑ, E)−H(E|Ẑ),
where the last inequality follows from basic information inequalities, and the fact that Z is uniform
over H ≡ [M ]. Let us denote Pe = 1− Pe. Expanding the RHS, we have:
I(Z; X̂U1 ) ≥ logM − PeH(Z|Ẑ, E = 1)− PeH(Z|Ẑ, E = 0)− 1
(Since H(Pe) ≥ H(E|Ẑ) and H(Pe) ≤ 1)
≥ Pe(logM −H(Z|Ẑ, E = 0)) − 1 (Since H(Z|Ẑ, E = 1) ≤ logM )
≥ Pe (logM − logMd)− 1 (Since H(Z|Ẑ, E = 0) ≤ log |Bd(Ẑ)| ≤ logMd)
Rearranging, we have:
Pe ≥ 1−
I(Z; X̂U1 ) + 1
logM − logMd
We now have two immediate corollaries of this lemma. First, we consider the non-adaptive learning
case, i.e., where the data of each user X̂u is obtained in an i.i.d manner. Then we have:
Corollary 21 Given a hypothesis Z drawn uniformly from H, for any non-adaptive learning algo-
rithm, the number of users satisfies:
Pe ≥ 1−
(
UI(Z; X̂u) + 1
logM − logMd
)
.
Next, using Lemma 6, we get a bound on the sample complexity of learning under local-DP.
Corollary 22 Given a hypothesis Z drawn uniformly from H, for any learning algorithm on U
privatized samples, each obtained via ǫ-local-DP, the average error probability satisfies:
Pe ≥ 1−
1
ln 2
(
Uǫ+ 1
logM − logMd
)
.
Note that these results do not imply that we are assuming a prior on the hypothesis class for our
algorithms; rather, the lower bound can be viewed as a probabilistic argument that shows that below
a certain sample complexity, any learner fails to distinguish between a large fraction of all possible
models.
Returning to our problem of learning item clusters, we note that M = KNK! in that case. Further,
by choosing d as the edit distance (Hamming distance) between two clusterings of items (i.e., for
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two clusterings CN and C ′N , d(CN , C ′N ) is the the number of items that are mapped to different
clusters in the two clusterings), we get that:
Md =
1
K!
d∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
(K − 1)i
=
KN
K!
P [Binomial(N, 1/K) ≥ N − d]
≤
KN
K!
exp
(
−NK(1− dN −
1
K )
2
3
)
Now, combining the above results, we obtain a more general version of Theorem 7.
Theorem 23 Suppose the underlying clustering CN (·) : [M ]→ [K] is drawn uniformly at random
from {0, 1}N . Further, for a given tolerance d > 0 and error threshold pmax, we define a learning
algorithm to be unreliable for the hypothesis class H if:
max
h∈[M ]
P
[
d(Ẑ, Z) > d
]
> pmax.
Then any learning algorithm that obeys ǫ-local-DP is unreliable if the number of queries U satisfies:
U < (1− pmax)
(
NK(1− dN −
1
K )
2
3ǫ
)
.
Appendix B. Analysis of the Pairwise Preference Algorithm
In this appendix, we present a complete proof for the performance of the Pairwise Preference Algo-
rithm from Section 3.2. For convenience, we first restate the theorem:
Theorem 24 (Theorem 8 in the paper) The Pairwise-Preference algorithm satisfies ǫ-local-DP.
Further, suppose the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of Â satisfy the following non-degeneracy con-
ditions:
• The L largest magnitude eigenvalues of A have distinct absolute values.
• The corresponding eigenvectors y1, y2, . . . , yL, normalized under the α-norm, ||y||2α =
∑K
k=1 αky
2
k,
for some α satisfy:
ti 6= tj , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ L
where ti := (y1(i), . . . , yL(i)).
Then, in the information-rich regime (i.e., when w = Ω(N)), there exists c > 0 such that the item
clustering is successful with high probability if the number of users satisfies:
U ≥ c (N logN) .
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Proof As mentioned before, privacy for the algorithm is guaranteed by the use of ǫ-DP bit release
(Proposition 4), and the composition property of DP (Proposition 2).
We will prove the sample complexity bound for the case where w = Ω(N) – the case where
rated items are not private follows similarly. From the definition of the ǫ-DP bit release mechanism,
we have that:
P[Su = 1] =
1 + (eǫ − 1)P[S0u = 1]
eǫ + 1
,
and thus for any pair of items {i, j}, defining bij ,
∑K
k=1 αk(bkibkj + (1− bki)(1− bkj)) (i.e., the
probability that a random user has identical preference for items i and j) and bij = 1−bij , we have:
P[Su = 1, Pu = {i, j}] =
1
N(N − 1)
(
1
eǫ + 1
+
(
eǫ − 1
eǫ + 1
)
w(w − 1)
N(N − 1)
bij
)
,
b′ij
N(N − 1)
,
P[Su = 0, Pu = {i, j}] =
1
N(N − 1)
(
eǫ
eǫ + 1
+
(
eǫ − 1
eǫ + 1
)
w(w − 1)
N(N − 1)
(bij − 1)
)
,
b′ij
N(N − 1)
,
where, under the assumptions that w = Ω(N) and ǫ = Θ(1), we have that b′ij , bij
′
are both Θ(1).
Now, since Âij =
∑
u∈U|Pu={i,j}
Su, we have that:
Âij ∼ Binomial
(
U,
bij
N(N − 1)
)
Setting U = cN logN , we have that:
P[Âij > 0] = 1−
(
1−
bij
N(N − 1)
)U
=
Ubij
N(N − 1)
+ Θ
(
U2
N4
)
= c′bij
logN
N
+Θ
(
(logN)2
N4
)
Thus we can interpret Â as representing the edges of a random graph over the item set, with an
edge between an item in class i and another in class j if Âij > 0; the probability of such an edge
is Θ
(
bij logN
N
)
. We can now use Theorem 1 from Tomozei and Massoulié (2011) to complete the
proof.
Appendix C. Lower bounds for the Information-scarce Setting
In this appendix, we provide generalizations and complete proofs for the results in Section 4.
Recall that we consider a scenario where there is a single class of users, and each item is ranked
either 0 or 1 deterministically by each user. CN (·) : [N ] → {0, 1} is the underlying clustering
function. We assume that the user-data for user u is given by Xu = (Iu, Zu), where Iu is a size w
subset of [N ] representing items rated by user u, and Zu are the ratings for the corresponding items;
in this case, Zu = {Z(i)}i∈Iu . We also denote the privatized sketch from user u as Su ∈ S , where
S denotes the space from which sketches are drawn, which we assume to be finite or countably
infinite. The sketch is assumed to obey ǫ-DP. Finally, we assume that Z is chosen uniformly over
{0, 1}N , and the set of items Iu rated by user u is also assumed to be chosen uniformly at random
from amongst all size-w subsets of [N ].
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C.1. Mutual Information under Generalized Channel Mismatch
Recall we define [N ]w to be the collection of all size-w subsets of [N ] = {1, 2, . . . , N}, and
D , [N ]w × {0, 1}
w to be the set from which user information (i.e., (I, Z)) is drawn (and define
D = |D| =
(N
w
)
2w). Finally EX [·] indicates that the expectation is over the random variable X. We
now establish a generalization of Lemma 9.
Lemma 25 Assume that under probability distribution P, the set I of items whose type is available
to a given user is independent of the type vector Z . Denote ps(i, z) := P((I, ZI) = (i, z)|S = s).
Also, for subsets j ⊂ [N ], we denote pj(z) := P(Zj = z). Then the following holds:
I(Z;S = s) ≤
∑
i,z
∑
i′,z′
ps(i, z)ps(i
′, z′)
[
1z≡z′
pi∪i′(z ∪ z
′)
pi(z)pi′(z′)
− 1
]
.
Note that in the above lemma we do not make any assumption regarding: i) the distribution of
Z, ii) the distribution of the user-data (I, Z). If Z is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}N , we recover
Lemma 9.
Proof [Proof of Lemma 25] From the definition of mutual information, we have:
I(Z;S) =
∑
z,s
P[(Z, S) = (z, s)] log
(
P[(Z, S) = (z, s)]
P[Z = z]P[S = s]
)
= ES [I(Z;S = s)] ,
where we use the notation:
I(Z;S = s) :=
∑
z
P[Z = z|S = s] log
(
P[Z = z|S = s]
P[Z = z]
)
Now note that:
P[Z = z|S = s] =
∑
(i1,z1)
P[Z = z, (I1, Z1) = (i1, z1)|S = s]
=
∑
(i1,z1)
P[Z = z|i1, z1]P[(I1, Z1) = (i1, z1)|s]
=
∑
(i1,z1)
ps(i, zi)
P[Z = z]
pi(zi)
1{z≡z1}.
Combining the equations, we get
I(Z;S = s) =
∑
z
∑
i1,z1
1z≡z1P(Z = z)
ps(i1, z1)
pi1(z1)
log
∑
i2,z2
1z≡z2
ps(i2, z2)
pi2(z2)
 .
Using Jensen’s inequality, the R.H.S. is upped bounded by the corresponding expression where
averaging over z conditionally on Zi1 = z1 is taken inside the logarithm, yielding
I(Z;S = s) ≤
∑
i1,z1
ps(i1, z1) log
∑
z
1z≡z1
P(Z = z)
pi1(z1)
∑
i2,z2
ps(i2, z2)
1z≡z2
pi2(z2)

=
∑
i1,z1
ps(i1, z1) log
∑
i2,z2
ps(i2, z2)1z1≡z2
pi1∪i2(z1 ∪ z2)
pi1(z1)pi2(z2)
 .
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The result now follows from the inequality log(x) ≤ x− 1.
C.2. Lower Bound on Scaling for Clustering with Local-DP
We now fill in the proofs for results from Section 4.3:
Lemma 26 (Lemma 12 in the paper) If w = o(N), then:∣∣∣∣∣
(N−w
w
)(N
w
) − (1− w2
N
)∣∣∣∣∣ = Θ
(
w4
N2
)
Proof First, it is easy to verify that the binomial coefficients satisfy:
⇒
(
1−
w
N − w + 1
)w
≤
(N−w
w
)(N
w
) ≤ (1− w
N
)w
Now for the upper bound, using the binomial expansion, we have:(
1−
w
N
)w
= 1−
w2
N
+Θ
(
w4
N2
)
Similarly for the lower bound, we have:(
1−
w
N − w + 1
)w
= 1−
w2
N − w + 1
+
w4
2(N − w + 1)2
− . . .
≥ 1−
w2
N
−
w3
N(N − w + 1)
+
w4
2(N − w + 1)2
− . . .
= 1−
w2
N
−Θ
(
w4
N2
)
Theorem 27 (Theorem 14 in the paper) Under the scaling assumption w = o(N1/3), and for
ǫ < ln(2), it holds that
I(Z, S) = O
(w
N
)
·
and thus there exists a constant c > 0 such that any cluster learning algorithm with local-DP is
unreliable if the number of users satisfies:
U < c
(
N2
w
)
.
Proof In the proof of Theorem 13, the two steps which are weak are the conversion to the base
measure P0[] using Lemma 11, and the evaluation of the bound for ∆1. We start off by performing
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a similar decomposition of the bound, but without first converting to the base measure. For any
S = s, we have:
E
[
2|I1∩I2|1{Z1≡Z2 − 1
]
=
N∑
ℓ=1
E
[
1{I1∩I2={ℓ}}(2 ∗ 1{Z1≡Z2} − 1)
]
+ E
[
1{|I1∩I2|>1}(2
|I1∩I2|1{Z1≡Z2} − 1)
]
= ∆′1 +∆
′′
1 +∆
′
2
where
∆′1 =
N∑
ℓ=1
E
[
1{ℓ∈I1∩I2}(2 ∗ 1Z1(ℓ)=Z2(ℓ) − 1)
]
∆′′1 = −
N∑
ℓ=1
E
[
1{ℓ∈I1∩I2;|I1∩I2|>1}(2 ∗ 1Z1(ℓ)=Z2(ℓ) − 1)
]
,
∆′2 = E
[
1|I1∩I2|>1(2
|I1∩I2|1{Z1≡Z2} − 1)
]
Note that ∆′1 + ∆′′1 are similar to ∆1 and ∆′2 similar to ∆2 in Theorem 13 (albeit without first
converting to the base measure). Unlike before, however, we first bound ∆′′1 +∆′2, establishing that
∆′′1 + ∆
′
2 = O(w
4/N2) = o(w/N) whenever w = o(N1/3). For ∆′1, we need to employ a more
sophisticated technique for bounding. As before, we write P0 for the base probability distribution
under which (I1, Z1) and (I2, Z2) are independent and uniformly distributed over D, and denote by
E0 mathematical expectation under P0. For ∆′′1, we have:
∆′′1 ≤
N∑
ℓ=1
E
[
1{ℓ∈I1∩I2;|I1∩I2|>1}
]
= E
[
|I1 ∩ I2|1{|I1∩I2|>1}
]
Since the RHS is non-negative, we use Lemma 11 to convert the expectation to the base measure.
Thus, we get:
∆′′1 ≤ e
2ǫ
[
E
0 [|I1 ∩ I2|]− P
0 [|I1 ∩ I2| = 1]
]
= e2ǫ
w
(N−1
w−1
)
− w
(N−w
w−1
)(
N
w
)
= e2ǫ
(
w2
N
−
(
w2
N − 2w + 1
) (N−w
w
)(N
w
) ) (15)
Similarly for ∆′2, we have:
∆′2 ≤ E
[
1{|I1∩I2|>1}2
|I1∩I2|1{Z1≡Z2}
]
≤ e2ǫE0
[
1{|I1∩I2|>1}2
|I1∩I2|1{Z1≡Z2}
]
≤ e2ǫP0 [|I1 ∩ I2| > 1] ,
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as P0 [Z1 ≡ Z2] = 2
−|I1∩I2|
. Now since I1 and I2 are picked independently and uniformly over all
size w subsets of [N ] (under P0), we have:
∆′2 ≤ e
2ǫ
(
1−
(N−w
w
)
+ w
(N−w
w−1
)(N
w
) ) = e2ǫ(1−(1 + w2
N − 2w + 1
) (N−w
w
)(N
w
) ) (16)
Finally combining equations (15) and (16), we get:
∆′′1 +∆
′
2 ≤ e
2ǫ
(
1 +
w2
N
−
(
1 +
2w2
N − 2w + 1
) (N−w
w
)(
N
w
) ) ,
and using Lemma 12, we get:
∆′′1 +∆
′
2 ≤ e
2ǫ
(
1 +
w2
N
−
(
1 +
2w2
N
+
2w2(2w − 1)
N(N − 2w + 1)
)(
1−
w2
N
−O
(
w3
N2
)))
= O
(
w4
N2
)
Thus, we now have:
E
[
2|I∩J |1{Z(ℓ)=Z′(ℓ)∀ℓ∈I∩J} − 1
]
≤
N∑
ℓ=1
E
[
1{ℓ∈I∩J}(2 ∗ 1Z(ℓ)=Z′(ℓ) − 1)
]
+O
(
w4
N2
)
Under the scaling assumption w = o(N1/3), the second term in the right-hand side of the
above equation is o(w/N), and we only need to establish that the first term in the right-hand side is
O(w/N).
As in Theorem 10, we introduce the notation P(ℓ ∈ I, Z(ℓ) = σ|S = s) = πℓ,σ (here we can
omit indexing with respect to s for notational convenience). The following identity is then easily
established:
N∑
ℓ=1
E1{ℓ∈I1∩I2}
(
21Z1(ℓ)=Z2(ℓ)} − 1
)
=
N∑
ℓ=1
(πℓ,0 − πℓ,1)
2 . (17)
The left-hand side of (17) is thus a non-negative definite quadratic form of the variables
pi,z := P(I = i, Z = z|S = s),
where we have that πℓ,σ =
∑
i,σ|ℓ∈i,z(ℓ)=σ pi,z in (17). We know however by Lemma 11 that these
variables are constrained to lie in the convex set defined by the following inequalities:∑
(i,z)∈D
pi,z = 1,
e−ǫ
D
≤ pi,z ≤
eǫ
D
.
Defining ǫ′ := eǫ − 1 = max(eǫ − 1, 1 − e−ǫ), we can relax the last constraint to
1− ǫ′ ≤ pi,zD ≤ 1 + ǫ
′.
Provided ǫ is small enough (precisely, provided ǫ < ln(2), which we have assumed), it holds that
ǫ′ < 1.
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Given this setup, we can now formulate the problem of upper bounding ∆′1 as the following
optimization problem:
maximize
{pi,z}(i,z)∈D
N∑
ℓ=1
(πℓ,0 − πℓ,1)
2
subject to
∑
(i,z)∈D
pi,z = 1,
pi,zD ∈
[
1− ǫ′, 1 + ǫ′
]
.
(18)
In order to evaluate this bound, we need to first characterize the extremal points of the above convex
set. We do this in the following lemma.
Lemma 28 The extremal points of the convex set of distributions {pi,z} defined by (18) consists
precisely of the distributions pAi,z indexed by the sets A ⊂ D of cardinality
|A| =
(
N
w
)
2w−1 =
D
2
,
defined by
pAi,z =
{
1+ǫ′
D if (i, z) ∈ A,
1−ǫ′
D if (i, z) /∈ A.
(19)
Proof Let {pi,z} be a probability distribution satisfying constraints (18). The aim is to establish the
existence of non-negative weights γS for each subset S ⊂ D of size D/2, summing to 1, and such
that for all (i, z) ∈ D, one has:
pi,z =
∑
S⊂D,|S|=D/2
γS(1 + ǫ
′
1(i,z)∈S − ǫ
′
1(i,z)/∈S)/D. (20)
Let us now express the existence of such weights γS as a property of a network flow problem. For
each n ∈ [D], define:
αn :=
(
pn −
1− ǫ′
D
)
D
2ǫ′
·
The constraint pn ∈ [(1 − ǫ′)/D, (1 + ǫ′)/D] entails that αn ∈ [0, 1]. Construct now a network
with for each n ∈ [D] two links, labelled (n ∈) and (n /∈), and with respective capacities αn and
1−αn. In addition, for each set S ⊂ [D], |S| = D/2, create a route rS through this network, which
for each n ∈ D crosses link (n ∈) if n ∈ S, and crosses link (n /∈) if n /∈ S. All such routes are
connected to a source and a sink node.
We now claim that the existence of probability weights γS satisfying (20) is equivalent to the
fact that the maximum flow through this network is equal to 1. Indeed, the existence of a flow of
total weight 1 is equivalent to the existence of a probability distribution γS on the routes rS through
this network which match the link capacity constraints, that is to say such that for all n ∈ [D], one
has: ∑
S:n∈S γS = αn,∑
S:n/∈S γS = 1− αn.
It is readily seen that this condition implies (20). Conversely, if the probability weights γS satisfy
(20), using the definition of αn, it is easily seen that the two previous equations hold.
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Let us now establish the existence of such a flow. To this end, we use the max flow-min cut
theorem. Any set of links that contains, for some n ∈ [D], both links (n ∈) and (n /∈), is a cut, and
its capacity is at least αn+1−αn, hence larger than 1. Any cut C which for each n either does not
contain (n ∈) or does not contain (n /∈) must be such that either:
|C ∩ {∪n∈[D](n ∈)}| > D/2 (21)
or:
|C ∩ {∪n∈[D](n /∈)}| > D/2, (22)
for otherwise we can identify S ⊂ [D], |S| = D/2 which crosses this cut C . Assume thus that (21)
holds. Assume without loss of generality that C contains the links (n ∈) for all n = 1, . . . ,D/2+1.
The weight of this cut is thus at least
∑D/2+1
n=1 αn. We now argue that this must be at least 1. Indeed,
it holds that:
D∑
n=1
αn = D/2.
However, if
∑D/2+1
n=1 αn < 1, using the fact that each αn is at most 1, it follows that
∑D
n=1 αn is
strictly less than 1 +D/2− 1 = D/2, a contradiction. The case when cut C verifies Equation (22)
is similar.
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 14. Since as argued the second term in the right-
hand side of (17) is a non-negative definite quadratic form of the pi,z, it is in particular a convex
function of the pi,z , and as such is maximized over the convex set described by (18) at one of its
extremal points, which are precisely identified by Lemma 28. It will thus suffice to establish the
following inequality for all A ⊂ D of size half the cardinality of the full set:
N∑
ℓ=1
(
πAℓ,0 − π
A
ℓ,1
)2
≤ O(w/N), (23)
where we introduced the notation for all ℓ ∈ [N ] and σ ∈ {0, 1}:
πAℓ,σ =
∑
i:ℓ∈i
∑
z:z(ℓ)=σ
pAi,z,
and pAi,z is as defined in (19). Introducing also the sets
Aℓ,σ = {(i, z) : ℓ ∈ i and z(ℓ) = σ},
we have
πAℓ,0 − π
A
ℓ,1 =
2ǫ′
(Nw)2w
[|Aℓ,0 ∩A| − |Aℓ,1 ∩A|]
= 2ǫ
′
(Nw)2w
〈1A, vℓ〉
(24)
where in the last display we used the following notations. 〈·, ·〉 stands for the scalar product in RD,
1A is the characteristic vector of the set A, and vℓ is defined as
vℓ(i, z) = 1{ℓ∈i} (1− 2z(ℓ)) .
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Equation (24) entails that the left-hand side of Equation (23) also equals
N∑
ℓ=1
(
2ǫ′
D
)2
〈1A, vℓ〉
2 . (25)
The scalar product 〈vℓ, vℓ′〉 reads, for ℓ 6= ℓ′:
〈vℓ, vℓ′〉 =
∑
i:ℓ,ℓ′∈i
∑
z(1− 2z(ℓ))(1 − 2z(ℓ
′))
=
∑
i:ℓ,ℓ′∈i 2
w−22 [(1) ∗ (1) + (1) ∗ (−1)]
= 0.
Note further that for all ℓ ∈ [N ], one has
||vℓ||
2 =
(
N − 1
w − 1
)
2w =
wD
N
.
Orthogonality and equality of norms among the vℓ readily implies that the expression in (25) is
upper-bounded by (
2ǫ′
D
)2 wD
N
||1A||
2.
Recalling that the vector 1A has D2 entries equal to 1, and all other entries equal to zero, the square
of its Euclidean norm ||1A||2 equals precisely D2 . Plugging this value in the last display, after
cancellation, one obtains that the expression in (25) is bounded by
2ǫ′2
w
N
·
This completes the proof.
Appendix D. Lower Bound for Adaptive Queries
In Section 6, to establish a lower bound on the sample complexity for privacy-preserving cluster-
learning with adaptive queries, we considered the following setup: we defined Z ∈ {0, 1}N to be
a random type-vector, and defined P0 to be the unconditional probability under which the Zi are
i.i.d. uniform on {0, 1}. Finally, in the proof of Theorem 17, we were interested in a given random
variable F :=
∑N
i=1 fi(Zi), where fi(Zi) ∈ [e−ǫ, eǫ]. Note that under P0, the random variable F
has variance ≤ 2ǫ′2N . The crux of the proof of Theorem 17 was based on the following technical
lemma:
Lemma 29 (Lemma 19 in the paper) If I(Z;ST1 ) ≤ δ, then we have:
VarT [F ] ≤ Var0[F ] ·max {20, 10δ} .
In this appendix, we provide a proof for this result. The argument proceeds in several steps.
Step 1: Bounding the divergence between the measure on F under PT and under P0:
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Lemma 30 For each f in the support of any discrete random variable F , let pf and p0f denote the
probabilities that F = f under PT and P0 respectively. Then we have:
H(P0)−H(PT ) ≥ D(p||p0) =
∑
f
pf log
(
pf
p0f
)
· (26)
Proof For each f , let Nf denote the number of vectors z ∈ {0, 1}N for which F = f , so that
p0f = Nf2
−N
. Now we have:
H(PT ) =
∑
f
pf
∑
z:F (z)=f
PT (z)
pf
[
log
(
1
pf
)
+ log
(
pf
PT (z)
)]
≤
∑
f
pf
[
log
(
1
pf
)
+ log(Nf )
]
=
∑
f
pf
[
log
(
1
pf
)
+ log(N) + log(p0f )
]
= H(P0)−D(p||p0),
where the inequality follows by upper-bounding the entropy of a probability distribution on a set of
size Nf by log(Nf ).
Step 2: Bounding variance of F under PT given divergence constraints:
Let F¯ = E0[F ] (i.e., the expectation of F under P0). Note that:
VarT (F ) = inf
x∈R
E
T (F − x)2 ≤ EPT (F − F¯ )
2 =
∑
f
pf (f − F¯ )
2.
Assume that the entropy H(PT ) verifies H(PT ) ≥ H(P0) − δ, for some δ ≥ 0. Then in view of
(26) and the previous display, an upper bound on the variance of F under PT is provided by the
solution of the following optimization problem:
Maximize
∑
f pf (f − F¯ )
2
over pf ≥ 0
such that
∑
f pf = 1
and
∑
f pf log
(
pf
p0
f
)
≤ δ. (27)
It is readily seen (for example, by introducing the Lagrangian of this optimization problem, and a
dual variable ν−1 > 0 for the constraint (27))that the optimal of this convex optimization problem
is achieved by:
pf :=
1
Z(ν)
p0fe
ν(f−F¯ )2 ,
for a suitable positive constant ν, where the normalization constant Z(ν) is given by:
Z(ν) :=
∑
f
p0fe
ν(f−F¯ )2 = E0eν(F−F¯ )
2
.
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For this particular distribution, the divergence D(p||p0) reads:∑
f
1
Z(ν)
p0fe
ν(f−F¯ )2
[
ν(f − F¯ )2 − logZ(ν)
]
= − log(Z(ν)) +
ν
Z(ν)
E
0(F − F¯ )2eν(F−F¯ )
2
,
so that constraint (27) reads:
− log(Z(ν)) +
ν
Z(ν)
E
0(F − F¯ )2eν(F−F¯ )
2
≤ δ. (28)
This characterization in turn allows to establish the following:
Lemma 31 Let ψ(ν) := logZ(ν). Assume there exist a, ν > 0 such that:
νa− ψ(ν) ≥ δ. (29)
Then the solution to the value of the optimization problem (27) is less than or equal to a.
Proof Note that by Hölder’s inequality, function ψ is convex, so that its derivative:
ψ′(ν) = Z−1(ν)E0(F − F¯ )
2eν(F−F¯ )
2
,
is non-decreasing. Note further that the function νψ′(ν) − ψ(ν) appearing in the left-hand side of
(28) is non-decreasing for non-negative ν, as its derivative reads νψ′′(ν). Thus the value ν∗ which
achieves the optimum is such that
ν∗ψ′(ν∗)− ψ(ν∗) = δ
and the sought bound is ψ′(ν∗). Now for a given a ∈ R, the supremum of νa − ψ(ν) is achieved
precisely at ν such that a = ψ′(ν). Thus if for some ν and some a, condition (29) holds, it follows
that:
sup
ν
(νa− ψ(ν)) ≥ δ = sup
ν
(νa∗ − ψ(ν)) ,
where a∗ := ψ′(ν∗). It follows from monotonicity of ν → νψ′(ν) − ψ(ν) that the value ν ′ where
the supremum is achieved in the left-hand side, and such that a = ψ′(ν ′), verifies ν ′ ≥ ν∗. Mono-
tonicity of ψ′ then implies that a ≥ a∗ as announced.
Step 3: Deriving explicit bounds, using concentration results under P0.
Consider the centered and scaled random variable:
G :=
F − F¯
σ
·
Recall that after centering, each variable fi(Zi) is bounded in absolute value by ǫ′. Thus, using the
Azuma-Hoeffding inequality yields the following bound:
P
0(G > A) ≤ e−A
2/2, A > 0, (30)
and the same bound holds for P0(G < −A). To obtain the above, we used the fact that after
centering, fi(Zi) is of the form σi(2Zi − 1) where σi is the standard deviation of fi(Zi) under P0.
We now apply these to bound the value of Z(ν) as follows:
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Lemma 32 Define σ2 = Var0[F ] (i.e., under P0), and consider any ν ∈ (0, 12σ2 ). Then the partitionfunction Z(ν) verifies:
Z(ν) ≤ 1 +
4νσ2
1− 2νσ2
· (31)
Proof We can write:
Z(ν) =
∫ ∞
0
P
0
(
eν(F−F¯ )
2
≥ t
)
dt ≤ 1 +
∫ ∞
1
P
0
(
ν(F − F¯ )2 ≥ log t
)
dt
= 1 +
∫ ∞
0
P
0
(
|G| ≥
√
x
νσ∗
)
exdx (Substituting ex = t)
= 1 +
∫ ∞
0
P
0 (|G| ≥ y) 2byeby
2
dy (Denoting b = νσ2 ∈ (0, 1/2), and substituting by2 = x)
= 1 +
∫ ∞
0
[
P
0(G ≥ y) + P0(G ≤ −y)
]
2byeby
2
dy.
Using Hoeffding’s bound (30), the last term is upper-bounded by
1 + 2
∫ ∞
0
e−y
2/22byeby
2
dy = 1 + 2
[
−2b
1− 2b
e−(y
2/2)∗(1−2b)
]∞
0
= 1 +
4b
1− 2b
,
as announced in (31).
Finally, using these three results, we can prove Lemma 29:
Proof [Proof of Lemma 29] Fix δ > 0, and recall σ2 := Var0[F ]. We now want find some b > 0
such that VarT [F ] ≤ bσ2. In view of Lemma 31, it suffices to verify that for some ν > 0, Condition
νbσ2 − ψ(ν) ≥ δ holds. In view of Lemma 32, denoting the corresponding upper bound to ψ(ν)
by:
φ(ν) :=
{
log
(
1 + 4νσ
2
1−2νσ2
)
:If νσ2 < 1/2
+∞ :Otherwise
,
it suffices to find b such that for some ν, νbσ2 − φ(ν) ≥ δ. Maximizing νbσ2 − φ(ν) over ν for
fixed b, one finds that the optimal value for ν is given by:
ν∗ =
1
2σ2
√
1−
4
b
,
Plugging this expression for ν∗ in νbσ2 − φ(ν), we have that bσ2 upper-bounds VarT [F ] if:
b
2
√
1−
4
b
− log
(
1 + (1− 4/b)1/2
1− (1− 4/b)1/2
)
≥ δ.
For b ≥ 16/3, it holds that 1/2 ≤ (1 − 4/b)1/2 ≤ 1. Thus under this condition on b, the left-hand
side of the above is at least as large as:
b
4
− log
(
[1 + (1− 4/b)1/2]2
1− 1 + 4/b
)
≥
b
4
− log(b) ≥
b
10
, if b > 20.
Thus, setting b = max {20, 10δ}, we see that the above conditions are satisfied.
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